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I. INTRODUCTION

In approaching the intersection of national security and trade
policies, the underlying issue is the extent to which trading nations
are prepared to permit the transfer of production functions deemed
important to national security to more efficient producers in another
country. Two examples are often raised in order to show how difficult it is to define "national security." Japan and Switzerland protect their agriculture. 1 Sweden protects its shoe producers. Armies
need to be both well fed and well soled. 2 When the least expensive
source of food or of shoes lies in another country, even a reliable
ally, the importing government may nevertheless prefer internal
sources of supply to be available in a moment of crisis. In
democracies, public clamour for internal capacity may exist. Indeed,
the more open the national economy, the greater the need for adaptive capabilities in case of disruptions to the international
marketplace. Reducing vulnerability to such external pressures
depends upon the adaptability of a nation's economic structure.
Less adaptable economies utilise protectionism to shield the
economy from external pressures. If domestic industries are either
unable or unwilling to adjust, the demand for protection rises. 3 It
is a difficult empirical question to determine how much of the
domestic demand for protection is a function of defence
preparedness and how much is a response to local inefficiencies and
the vagaries of an open, interdependent world economy.
Countries in the Soviet bloc have largely insulated themselves
from these fluctuations. Soviet exports decline when business in
• B.Com., LL.B, University of New South Wales; LL.M, University of Michigan;
Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia.
1. Japan, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 82 (Apr. 20, 1982), 813 (Sept. 7, 1982); Reservation in the Protocol for the Accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 14 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [BISD] 6 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Santos, The National Security Exception to Free Trade, 30 FED. Bus. NEWS
& J. 293 (1983).
3. MALMGREN, Threats to the Multilateral System, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 189, 191
(W. Cline ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CLINE].
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the capitalist world is depressed. Foreign exchange dealings with
the West and commodity imports therefrom are controlled within
the scope of the prevailing economic plan. For imports such as grain
and high technology goods which are used to fill significant gaps
in domestic supply, however, the Soviet Union is dependent on the
availability of imports from the West.
Within the Western World, the United States now shares economic preeminence with both the European Economic Community
(EEC) and Japan. Much consultation occurs. However, while united
as allies for defence policy purposes, policies with respect to the
organisation of world markets do not form a cohesive unit. In the
1980's, no lead for liberalisation of trade policies can be unambiguously identified. Economies at different stages of historical
development, with dissimilar resource endowments and a variety
of cultures and political systems, can, when left rudderless in the
wind, develop a sense of vulnerability and defenciveness. 4
Professor Heinz Arndt, writing during the Second World War,
analysed the pre-War policies of Germany, Japan, and Italy along
similar lines:
[S]o long as countries have reason to fear the recurrence of war,
no emphasis on the economic benefits of international trade will
induce them to forego such a measure of economic self-sufficiency
as their governments consider feasible and desirable for their
military security. 5

Although the United States, the EEC and Japan conducted
much of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
without involving middle and lower ranki~ trading nations, the
dominant three developed neither stellar not,·confluent policies. The
"lesser" nations were disappointed at being so excluded. Their confidence in an open world economy was neither restored nor boosted
after the Tokyo Round. 6 A failure to identify and grapple with the
growing diffusion of economic and political interests has left open
the possibility of a recurrence of the fear-influenced policies of the
past.

4. Cf, Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.
93, 95, 96 (1978).

WORLD

TRADE L.

5. H. ARNDT, THE ECONOMIC LESSONS OF THE NINETEEN-THIRTIES 27 4 (1944).

6. Jackson, supra note 4, at 95-98.
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II. ECONOMICS, TRADE AND SECURITY INTERESTS
A. A COST-BENEFIT MODEL FOR TRADE AND SECURITY
INTERESTS

Trade is only entered into when perceived benefits outweigh
perceived costs. When core values are seen to be at risk, whether
or not they indeed are, the costs are seen to outweigh the benefits
of trade. In this balance must lie a recognition that powerful nations
can induce others to trade with them. Although both gain from the
exchange they do not gain equally. 7 The more efficient economy incorporates gains from trade more effectively than its inferior
trading partner. Realising this, less efficient economies are tempted
to adopt autarkic policies in the hope of improving their industries,
and later more profitably, rejoining the currents of world trade.
It is not surprising that the two great champions of the market
mechanism in modern times have been Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth. 8 NationState~ with differing economic structures can be expected to inject differing doses of protectionism into their trade policies.
In analysing international economic history and the
jurisprudence of international economic law, it is important to keep
these differences in mind. Whether the differences lead to entropy
in the society of nations or to convergent goals, lies within and not
beyond the capacity of our leaders and policy makers.
B.

SUSTAINING A LIBERAL WORLD ECONOMY

The Ricardian theory of international trade turned upon a static
approach to comparative advantage. Countries with abundant land
would export primary produce. Those with abundant labour would
produce and sell human wares. The relatively more technologically advanced would sell the produce of their know-how. This theory
was challenged by Alexander Hamilton in his Report on the Subject
of Manufactures. 9 Hamilton emphasized that relative factor

7. K. KNORR, BRITISH COLONIAL THEORIES 1570-1870 248 (1944).
8. With respect to the growing roles of both the EEC and Japan, see BERGSTEN &
CLINE, Trade Policy in the 1980s: An Overview, in CLINE, supra, note 3, at 59; PATTERSON, The
European Community as a Threat to the System, in CLINE, supra note 3, at 223; Grey, ANote
on U.S. Trade Practices, id. at 243.
9. The Report was presented to the United States House of Representatives in 1791.
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endowments 10 were fluid and dynamic. For example, the encouragement of immigration causes a shift in relative trading capabilities
with respect to labour intensive goods. Less efficient nations become
more efficient not by trading with their superiors but by deliberately altering their mix of factor endowments and relative efficiency
levels.
Hamilton's theory lies behind much of the economic nationalism
of developing countries in both the past and present. According to
Professor Richard Gilpin:
Economic nationalism, both in the nineteenth century and today,
is a response to the tendency of markets to concentrate wealth
and power as well as to establish dependency relations between
strong and weak economies. Although markets over time stimulate
the diffusion of economic activities and industries, the tendency
in the short run is for the concentration of wealth in the advanced
economies to take place faster than the spread of economic activities in the developing economies. In order to protect its nascent
industries and safeguard domestic interests against external
market forces, the government of the developing economy tends
to pursue protectionist and related nationalistic policies. 11

As the strong gain more from trade than the weak, the gulf
between them widens. The weak become jealous. The strong become
anxious. Transposing the argument of Professor John Kenneth
Galbraith in The Affluent Society 12 to the world scene, the more the
rich have to lose, the more afraid they are of losing their preferred
position. Nationalistic pressures in the weak and defenciveness of
the strong, lead to autarkic reorientation by governments. 13 Each
feels a sense of insecurity and takes various protective measures
which tend toward entropy in international relations.
The alternative to what shall in this paper be termed "entropic
autarky" is an open system in which the strong actively assist the
weak in becoming more efficient at incorporating the gains from
trade in mutually beneficial ways. The ultimate goal is to maximise
10. These endowments are Land, Labour, Capital/Technology and Enterprise (Management Skills).
11. GILPIN, Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective,
in ECONOMIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 404-41 (K. Knorr & F.N. Trager eds. 1977). See
generally H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN OLD AND NEW STATES (1967).
12. J.K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (3d ed. 1976).
13. See generally MALMGREN, supra note 3, at 191; Jackson, supra note 4, at 93.
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the gains from trade while catering to the development needs of
weaker economies. The empirical questions of identifying, evaluating
and utilising the fluid components of comparative advantage are
beyond the scope of this paper. It is the thesis of this paper that
the process of entropic autarky brings into full view the interface
between trade policy and national security .14 The system of international economic law cannot profitably ignore the problem and indeed its progressive development can only benefit from a reasoned
approach to both the national security issue and the process of entropic autarky to which it is related.

III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
A. LAW AND INTERNATIONAL

ORDER

International law survives by consensus. The Nation-States
which form the constituency of international law do not legislate
through a parliament or congress, seldom litigate their differences
before a court or tribunal, and are not the subjects of a supranational executive or sovereign. Professor Louis Henkin has concluded:
Nations sometimes have to determine law for themselves from ambiguous precedents, in circumstances rendering objectivity difficult
and where the area of permissible conduct is not obviously defined .
. . . That the action will never in fact be passed upon by such [an
international] tribunal, that some may question the very concept
of impartiality of an international tribunal, that lawfulness is in
fact determined for their own purposes by governments inevitably
more-or-less partial, may modify but does not vitiate the basic conception of lawfulness or unlawfulness in the behaviour of nations. 15

Professor Roger Fisher has argued that compliance with law
by governments (and persons) does not depend on the availability
of organised force to coerce compliance. Rather, the subjects of law
assess for themselves their long-term interests and find that compliance and orderly conduct are beneficial thereto. 16 An order which
serves the perceived interests of a majority or dominant section
of its constituency is enduring. So long as disobedience is the ex-

14. MALMGREN, supra note 3, at 199·200.
15. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 41·42 (2d ed. 1979).
16. Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L.
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ception rather than the rule, the system functions smoothly. Professor Fisher of Harvard Law School considers that coerced compliance lubricates but does not fuel the wheels of a legal system.
The international system, however, lacks this lubricant. International law does lack that element of precision which might assist
its usefulness in preventing as well as tempering the breach of or
interference with trading obligations on national security grounds.
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has observed:
[O]nce we approach at close quarters practically any branch of international law, we are driven, amidst some feeling of incredulity,
to the conclusion that although there is as a rule a consensus of
opinion on broad principle - even this may be an overestimate in
some cases - there is no semblance of agreement in relation to
specific rules and problems. 17

In the international arena, it is states practice, more often than
judicial decisions, which serves to concretise the principles.
Resistance to legal restraints based upon an insistence that lacunae
or gaps in the law exist and so, a matter is purely political, has
been short-lived even at the instance of great powers. The Soviet
Union could not survive without trade and diplomacy. She has
asserted customary principles such as territorial integrity, sovereign
and diplomatic immunities, and the binding effect of treaties often
under the rubric of "peaceful coexistence." 18 Similarly, as China continues to incorporate herself into the society of nations, she has
invoked and applied international law, even with respect to security
concerns. 19
This reference to law gives a framework in which states may
further their interests, even their vital interests. Law can also
engender order and peaceful processes for the resolution of disputes.
Entropic autarky is more likely to proceed when nations' senses
of insecurity lead to not only distrust of other nations, but of the
legal framework in which international relations are conducted. In
urging, as Professor John Jackson has, a revival of "rule diplomacy"
rather than "power diplomacy," it is the reversal of the process
17. Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L
L. 16, 17 (1955); see J. STONE OF LAW AND NATIONS 211-12 (1974).
18. L. HENKIN, supra note 15, at 108-09.
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1962, at l, col. 6. China challenged her border with
India charging that the so-called McMahon line wa an illegally drawn border.
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of entropic autarky which is sought. 20 Because it is states' vital interests which are at stake, the international lawyer needs to proceed delicately. This, however, is not to say that these fundamental
issues should be sidestepped or ignored. 21
It has often been stated that international law, including international economic law, does not operate in times of war or of
serious crisis. 22 Yet this margin beyond which the rule of law may
not venture forth is seldom defined. Though many have called for
an expanded use of international arbitration as a means of settling
international disputes, the call has "rather symbolised the messianic
hope of subjecting the sovereign State, with its claim to be its own
sole judge, to the olympian impartiality of third party judgement
as a means of abolishing war." 23 While hopes for third party prevention of war may be forlorn, the removal of security issues from international forums by the unilateral decisions of states can only impair the dispute resolution process.
International law is enforced by the subtle means of peer
pressure. Once the problem receives an airing in an international
forum, resolution without formal adjudication may occur as the
states involved listen to and perhaps better understand their
neighbour's interests. Indeed, states may be more willing to place
security concerns on the table for discussion if they have no need
to fear a formal adjudication against their interests. Without arising
grievances, resolution by less than peaceful means is more inviting
an option if only because mutual understanding has not been given
a chance to develop.
So it is in international economic law. By providing a framework
for economic activity undertaken to protect national security to be
discussed, international as well as national objectives can be pursued. An act of protectionism or a currency restriction does not
lose its economic character because it also has a security flavour.

20. JACKSON, GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in CLINE supra note
3 at 159-87; see also Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal,
12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980); Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade
System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978).
21. J. STONE, Law and Force: Some Tasks for Survival, in OF LA w AND NATIONS 443, 446
(1974).
22. See, e.g., H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 282-83 (4th ed. 1967).
23. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 98 (1959).
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WAR, COLD WAR AND THE LAW OF PEACE

International relations are replete with examples of unfriendly
relations not accompanied by similar hostilities. Jessup suggested
three characteristics of such "cold war." 24 First, a hostility and strain
between opposing parties would be identified. 25 Second, no solution
of a focal issue would restore friendly relations. 26 Finally, the opposing parties would exhibit a reluctance to resort to armed force
at least for extended periods of time. 27 According to Jessup, the
replacement of an illusion of peace with a legal declaration of the
"state of intermediacy" would clarify international legal relations. 28
Negotiations for limited objects would not be accompanied by disappointment at incomplete resolution since the state of intermediacy
would be a "normal" condition. 29 Professor McDougal has rejected
even this trichotomy arguing for a recognition by international decisionmakers that "peace" and "war" are but polar extremes of a continuum of degrees of coercion. 30
The identification of the degree of coercion is a prerequisite
to, but not the same task as, evaluating a conflict from the decisionmaker's perspective and then developing a policy response. International law can come into play at the evaluation stage. By categorizing the permissibility of the initial conduct, the law may prohibit,
permit or mandate a response. It is this functional deficiency which
caused Professor Julius Stone to remark:
Besides its lamentable effects in discouraging efforts to mitigate
human sufferings, the well-intentioned refusal to recognise the
obstinate complexity of the role of war also prevents recognition
of the extent to which this role projects itself into times of peace. 31

The Soviet response to the suggestions of Professors Jessup
and McDougal has been given by Professor Tunkin in his Hague

24. Jessup, Should International L aw R ecognize an Intermediate S tatus Between Peace
and War, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954).
25. Id. at 100-01.
26. Id. at 101.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 102. Normalcy, in fact , is not desirable as a value.
30. McDougal, Peace and War: F actual Continuum with Multiple L egal Consequences,
49 AM. J. lNT'L L. 63 (1955).
31. J. STONE , supra note 23, at xxxvi.
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lectures. 32 The recognition of an underlying condition of hostility
was anathema to the stated Soviet preference for "peaceful coexistence." The difference between East and West on ideological issues
is not, according to Professor Tunkin, "an insurmountable obstacle
to reaching an agreement relating to accepting specific rules as
norms of international law." 33 Perhaps the most famous test of the
relevance of law in time of crisis is the case of the Cuban quarantine in October 1962. The facts need not be recounted here; suffice
to say that war did not break out. 34 Nevertheless, former U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported to the American Society of International Law: "I cannot believe that there are principles
of law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life. No
law can destroy the state creating the law. The survivial of states
is not a matter of Law." 35
Yet it appears that international law was referred to extensively in conditioning the means whereby survival interests were
to be upheld by the Kennedy administration. 36 The effects on trade
relations of a cold war (or state of intermediacy to use Professor
J essup's term) may validly be compared to the effects of war upon
economic obligations. The legal outbreak of war creates changes
in the legal force of international transactions regardless of the state
of hostilities.
As to treaties such as defence accords, it may be safely suggested that the threat or existence of hostilities will activate rather
than diminish their applicability. Treaties dealing with matters such
as neutrality and economic cooperation, including friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, will almost certainly be abrogated
in a state of belligerency.37 Between these two classes, international
law has little clarified the grey areas of the spectrum. In particular,
modern trade and economic cooperation agreements, 38 including the

32. Tunkin, Co-E xistence and General International Law, 95 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS [A.D.l.R.C.) l, 72-74 (1958).
33. Id. at 59.
34. S ee E. MCWHINNEY: "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 72-85 (1964). See generally id. at 73-74, nn.2, 5 & 6 (sources cited in footnotes).
35. Acheson, Law and Conflict: Changing Patterns and Contemporary Challenges, [1963]
PRoc. AM. Soc·y INT'L L. 13, 14.
36. S ee E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 34, at 78-79, nn. 21-26.
37. J. STONE. supra note 23, at 448.
38. S ee infra note 127.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), make allowance
for breakdown of peaceful relations presumably in order to ensure
survival of the agreement up to restoration of peaceful relations. 39
The comparative effects of war and cold war upon economic relations can be seen by reviewing the cold war of the 1950's and 1960's.
In the immediate post-World War II period, Denmark agreed
to supply the Soviet Union with a tanker. The United States pressed
Denmark to break its agreement. Delivery could lead to termination
of aid to Denmark under the so-called "Battle Act." Denmark remained unwilling to terminate its agreement, and the United States
did not terminate aid because to do so would have been "detrimental
to the security of the United States." There was an acknowledgement that U.S. security interests were better served by maintaining East-West trade links and upholding treaty obligations than by
utilising coercion, albeit in support of American defence policy but
in violation of international law. This is not to say that defence policy
is always subordinated to legal restr.-a'.ints, but rather, that it is
tempered by them. George Keenan, a distinguished American diplomat, stressed that the role of law in ensuring the smooth functioning of international life was minimal at best where states' vital interests or military security were concerned, but limited these exceptional circumstances to "those elementary upheavals that involve
the security of great political systems or reflect the emotional
aspirations and fears of entire nations."'0
This extreme condition did not surround that recent attempt
by President Reagan to block the flow of goods and technology to
the Soviet Gas Pipeline being built to link the Soviet Union and
Western Europe. In this example, too, U.S. measures were unsuccessful. The legal arguments of Western Europeans, 41 adequately
canvassed elsewhere, were persuasive. 42

39. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-1, T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). Summary Record of the Eighteenth Meeting, Sixth Committee: Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/CONF. 2/C.6/SR. 18.
40. G. KEENAN, REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 38-39 (2d ed. 1966).
41. Commission of the European Communities, Legal Service, European Communities:
Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R. , reprinted in 211.L.M.
891 (1982).
42. Aide-Memoire of the Commission of the European Communities and the Embassy
of France presented to the U.S. Department of State, Mar. 20, 1984, at 3.
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NATIONAL SECURITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

In accepting national security as a valid objective of states and
as a jurisprudential concern, it is postulated that international
economic law may look to the more general public international law
as a model for developing its rules.
Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations sought
to deem war against one League member to be a war against all
League members automatically requiring a complete economic embargo against the state breaching the Covenant by a declaration
of war. Of course consensus was most elusive on the initial question of whether a breach of the Covenant had actually occurred.
This question was left for each state's subjective determination. 43
This subjective element effectively defeased the collective nature
of the international security arrangement. So long as one state of
some influence opposed sanctions, collective control could not work.
Self-protection, though formally a residual remedy was, in fact, a
more futile response than awaiting the unravelling of collective process. In recognition of this, the United Nations (UN) order embodies
both individual and collective defence mandates. The collective mandate can only be effected by the Security Council and is subject
to veto, an approach more realistic than that of the League
Convenant. 44
In particular, the doctrine of self-preservation appears to be
readily adaptable to the economic scene. This doctrine stems from
the negotiations relating to the Destruction of the Caroline between
the then British rulers of Canada and the United States, The facts
of the Caroline case are as follows:
The case rose out of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. The rebel
leaders, despite steps taken by U.S. authorities to prevent
assistance being given to them, managed on December 13, 1837,
to enlist at Buffalo, in the U.S., the support of a large number of
American nationals. The resulting force established itself on Navy
Island in Canadian waters from which it raided the Canadian shore
and attacked passing British ships. The force was supplied from
the U.S. shore by an American ship, the Caroline. On the night
43. Assembly Res. Vl.2, The Economic Weapon, LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J. Spec. Supp.
No. 6, at 24 (1920-21).
44. Neff, The Law of Economic Coercion: Lessons from the Past and Indications of the
Future, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 411, 428-31 (1981).
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of December 29-30, the British sefaed the Caroline which was then
in the American port of Schlosser, fired her, and sent her over
Niagara Falls. Two U.S. nationals were killed. The legality of the
British acts was discussed in detail in correspondence in 1841-42
when the U.K. sought the release of a British subject, McLeod,
who had been arrested in the U.S. on charges of murder and arson
arising out of the incident. 45

In defence of the British action, Lord Ashburton pleaded necessity
but cautioned "[t]his must always be a subject of much delicacy,
and should be considered by friendly nations with great candor and
forbearance." 46
For the United States, Secretary of State Webster stated the
conditions for a legitimate act of self-preservation which have now
become an axiom of international law:
Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions
growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of that
self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation'. 47

Curiously, Mr Webster hinted that the rule was not limited to
military situations and self-defence in that sense. This hint has been
taken up most recently in the case concerning the Air Services
Agreement of March 27, 1946, between the United States and
France.48 Arbitrators Riphagen, Ehrlich and Reuter applied the rule
to a case of reprisal for alleged breach of a commercial treaty.
In considering the question of proportionality, the Tribunal took
into account the relative injuries suffered and the importance of
the questions of principle arising from the alleged breach. 49 The
Tribunal rejected the plea that a duty to negotiate first, in order
not to aggravate the dispute, had to be satisfied to legitimate the
45. 2 J. MOORE. A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 409, 412 (1842); c.f. N aulilaa Case (Port.
v. Ger.) 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012, 1016 (1928).
46. Letter from Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary to Mr. Webster, Secretary
of State for the United States (July, 28, 1842), reprinted in J. MOORE, supra note 45, at 411-12.
47. Letter from Mr. Webster, Secretary of State for the United States, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in J. MOORE, supra note 45, at 412
(emphasis added).
48. Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March (U.S. v. Fr.) 54 l.L.R.
303 (Arbitral Tribunal established by a Compromis of Arbitration 1979).
49. Id. at 338, para. 83.
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reprisal. 50 However, the reprisals had to be withdrawn as a sign
of good faith when the dispute was set down for arbitration or
judicial settlement. 51 Legitimacy did not depend upon necessity of
response. It seems that economic reprisal may be distinguished from
its military equivalent in that the only condition for legitimacy
where armed force is not involved is that of proportionality.
Whether this rule can be transposed to the frameworks of the
GA TT and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) remains a topic
for exploration in succeeding sections of this paper.
Even in the general context, it is surprising that the Tribunal
found no duty to postpone retaliatory action until less inflammatory
yet practicable pressures had been exhausted. Articles 2(3) and 33
of the United Nations Charter impose a duty of pacific settlement
in cases where international peace and security are endangered. 52
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 being a "Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter" 53 has added body to the principle and extended it, de lege
ferenda, to less serious disputes. The principles have been reaffirmed
in the Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes. 54 The norm derives from Security Council Resolution 188
condemning reprisals "as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." 55
Differences of opinion exist between eminent jurists as to
whether there is a norm of obligation expressing a condition of
necessity for legitimacy of retaliatory action 56 or a norm of aspiration with whose compliance legitimacy is better grounded but
50. Id. at 338-39, paras. 84-89.
51. Id. at 340-41, para. 96.
52. See generally Blum, Economic Boycotts in International Law, 12 TEXAS INT'L L.J.
5, 13-15 (1977); Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and U.S. Pressure Against Chile: Economic
and Political Concern and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3,
31-32 (1974).
53. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR (1833d plen. mtg), U.N. Doc A/4355, Pt. VIII, at 1, reprinted in 65 AM.
J. INT'L L. 243 (1971).
54. Draft, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.32/Add.1 (March 18, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M.449 (1982).
55. Resolution adopted by the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/5650 (1964).
56. See generally P. JESSUP. A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948); SKUBISZEWSKI. Use
of Force by States. Collective Security. The Law of War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
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neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of legality. 57 Professor
Riphagen appears to have considered the doctrines of necessity and
exhaustion of more pacific means of redress to be no more than
norms of aspiration from which states were entitled to deviate.
During the preparation of Resolution 2625, "the complete or
partial interruption of economic relations" was argued to be at least
as much in need of regulation as military action. 58 This argument
was resisted by Western delegates for whom economic measures
were to be considered valid means of influencing other states'
policies. 59 To the former group of states, insisting upon prior exhaustion of direct negotiations promoted compromise of competing
interests; whilst to the latter, freedom to experiment with means
of settlement was of higher priority.60 For the law to channel states'
actions taken for self-preservation, a consensus was needed as to
when the threshold threat to national security would be sufficiently evident to be effectively controlled. This consensus remained absent. Proscription of such defencive action can only be chimerical. 61
Short of proscription, the legal channelling of self-help into less
disruptive yet effective behaviours remains a desirable if challenging goal. Doctrines of peaceful settlement stemming from Article
INTERNATIONAL LA w 7 45-46 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, [1963] PROC. AM. Soc·v. INT'L. L. 147.
57. See Case Concerning Air Services Agreement, supra note 48 and accompanying
text; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law,
81 A.D.l.R.C. 500 (1952); D. BOWETT. SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1958); J. STONE,
supra note 17, at 1-38.
58. See, e.g., Speach of Mr. Dadzie (Ghana), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.5 at 17 (Oct. 16,
1964); Speech of Dr. Khalil (Egypt), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.8 (Oct. 16, 1964); Speech of Dr.
Pechoto (Czech.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.8 at 4-6 (Oct. 16, 1964); and Speeches of Dr. Krishna
Rao (India), U.N. Docs. A/AC.119/SR.3 at 7-8, (Oct. 16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.23 at 6 (Oct. 22,
1964). These speeches were made to the Special Committee on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States.
59. See, e.g., Speeches of Sir Kenneth Bailey (Aust.), U.N. Docs. A/AC.119/SR.10 at
7 (Oct. 16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR at 14-15 (Oct. 22, 1964); Speech of Mr. Colombo (Arg.), U.N.
Doc. A/AC.119/SR.19 at 18 (Oct. 19, 1964); Speeches of Mr. Schwebel (U.S.), U.N. Docs.
A/AC.119/SR.3 at 12 (Oct.16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.15 at 17-18 (Oct. 19, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.22
at 19 (Oct. 22, 1964); Speeches of Mr. Sinclair (U.K.), U.N. Docs. A/AC.199/SR.5 at 12-13 (Oct.
16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.16 at 13 (Oct. 19, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.19 at 5-8 (Oct. 21, 1964). These
speeches were made to the Special Committee of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States.
60. McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The Union
Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. l, 17-18 (1966).
61. J. STONE. supra note 17, at 2-3; J. STONE, supra note 23, at 243-46.
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2(3) of the UN Charter can provide a springboard for further
developments.
Resolution 2625 is ambivalent between its dual roles of codifying classical legal principles and developing a peaceful world order.
It speaks to independent rather than interdependent states. 62 International economic law, as developed through the jurisprudence
of the GATT, is arguable more consonant with international interdependence. The difference shows up in GATT practice a that practice deviates from the aforementioned practice under the doctrine
of self-preservation.

IV. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFFS AND
TRADE (GATT)
A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
Originally drafted contemporaneously with the Charter of the
proposed International Trade Organization (ITO), the GATT was
fashioned to be the embodiment of the results of tariff negotiations
held in Geneva from April to October, 1947.63 It contained clauses
to protect against the harms of evasions of tariff commitments. The
general GATT clauses were comparable with, yet subsidiary to, the
ITO Charter. Following upon delays and difficulties in obtaining
American Congressional approval of the ITO Chapter, the ITO was
stillborn, and in order to accommodate lengthy parliamentary approval procedures in other countries, the GATT itself was not
brought into force.
Instead, the GATT was brought to life through a "Protocol of
Provisional Application" signed i.n 1947 and effective on January
l, 1948.64 So, by this circuitous route the focal body of international
trade law was born. 65 The Protocol activates the GATT with two
main differences from the text of the treaty. These are first, a grand-

62. Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 713, 735 (1971).
63. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39.
64. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (effective Jan. 1, 1948).
65. See generally E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 3-4 (1982); J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 369-89 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as JACKSON 1977); J. JACKSON. WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 3.2 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as JACKSON 1969).
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father clause 66 immunising inconsistent legislation existing on October 30, 1947, and second, a shorter notice requirement for
withdrawal from the GATT, namely sixty days rather than six
months as in the GATT proper. 67 Neither of these differences affect the following discourse. In effect, the states' party to the Protocol apply the GATT treaty itself.
The object and purpose of the GATT are primarily to be
garnered from the text of the treaty and particularly the preamble.68
The GATT has a concise preamble. It expresses the purpose, scope
and genus of tools embodied in the agreement. Economic wealth
maximisation is to be achieved by a liberalisation of international
trade barriers including tariffs, quantitative restrictions and
discriminatory treatment. Article XXI reads as follows:

Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential
security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from
which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials
as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action
in pursuance of its obligations under the UN Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security. 69
66. Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 64, art. l(a).
67. See, Protocol of Provisional Application, id. art. 5; c.f General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXXI.
68. I. SINCLAIR. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 75 (1973) (citing
Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation with Special Reference to the Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 318 (1969); c.f, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17(2) of the Charter),
1962 I.C.J. 150, 186 (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) (J. Spender, separate opinion).
69. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXL
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Ninety nations are party to the GATT. 70 One, Tunisia, has
acceded provisionally, and twenty-eight maintain de facto application of the GATT. 71 This is arguably equivalent to one hundred and
nineteen contemporary, identical declarations by those states of
their understanding of the state of law, at least de legeferenda. This
understanding cements into lex lata as their subsequent behaviours
converge in compliance with the Treaty. 72 It is not clear whether
this cementation has occurred for part of all of the GATT. An "extensive and virtually uniform" states practice is required. 73 A sense
of legal obligation or opinio juris sive necessitas need accompany
the behaviour. 74 However, as Professor Baxter has observed:
The hard fact is that States more often than not do not refer to
or exhibit any sense of legal obligation in their own conduct. Mention of 'obligation' and 'duty' is more often to be found in
statements about what other States should do than in a State's
assertions about what it itself is doing. 75

Difficulty in identifying a real sense of obligation has plagued the
legal interpretation of General Assembly resolutions such as Resolution 2625 on Friendly Relations averted to above.
In the economic sphere, the problem is an acute one. Having
different economic structures and in particular, different exchange
mechanisms, the rules of and exceptions in the GA TT system may
be interpreted according to competing legal principles whose applications reflect a variety of value laden choices. A formal absence
of restriction on certain conduct renders the conduct legally neutral
but also has the effect of permitting it. 76 An aura of normalcy may
develop so long as the neutrality of the law continues. This aura
hides the structural differences between economies and the variety
of values embedded in a pluralistic international constituency.
Because much secrecy surrounds the national security policies of
states, the problems of identifying, analysing and consensually
reconciling these policies is compounded.
70. E. McGOVERN supra note 65, at 45-46.
71. Id. at 46.
72. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 A.D.l.R.C. 25, 55 (1970).
73. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, 43 (Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969).
74. Id. at 44.
75. Baxter, supra note 72, at 68.
76. See J. STONE, supra note 17, at 83-86; Goldie, Legal Pluralism and "No Law" Sectors, 32 AUST'L. L.J. 220 (1958).
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B. APPROACHING THE INTERPRETATION OF GATT ARTICLE XX!
Whether or not Article XXI and other provisions of the GA TT
have evolved into customary international law is a matter of interest because over one-third of the family of nations are neither
party to nor apply the GATT, yet have significant economic and
security interests. Before ascribing to the norm a customary
character, identification of its content needs to be undertaken.
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 77 prescribe an order for assessing the relative value of the
materials available for treaty interpretation. 78 Much doctrinal
dispute surrounds the issue of treaty interpretation. 79 The very existence of relevant guiding principles has been challenged. 80 In any
text one can find ambiguities and imprecisions. 81 The GATT is no
exception. What follows will be an attempt to apply the interpretative process of the Vienna Convention without submerging
the value laden choices which arise.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires an examination
of text, context, and relations between the parties following treaty
formation. This article has arguably achieved the status of
customary international law. 82
Seven key issues will be investigated in an effort to interpret
the GATT in relation to the Vienna Convention:
(1) The role of "good faith" in interpreting the national
security exception to GATT obligations, including the use of Article XXI to excuse the impeding of the attainment of GATT
objectives.
(2) The scope of Article XXI and the subject-matter to which
it applies.

77. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted
in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 885 (1969).
78. I. SINCLAIR. supra note 68, at 73.
79. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 68.
80. Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation, 1 SYDNEY L. REV. 344 (1955).
81. See D. O'CONNELL. INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR STUDENTS 108 (1971); Address by w. w.
Bishop Jr., Seminar on the Law of Treaties, University of Michigan (Mar. 19, 1984); c.f Report
of the International Law Commission, 21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 9) at 50 U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.1 (1966).
82. See, e.g., Opinion of Her Majesty's Law Officers, Cmnd. 4589 at 15; I. SINCLAIR,
supra note 68, at 14-23; Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
at 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 (1966).
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(3) The interrelationship between the most favoured nation
rule (MFN) and security concerns.
(4) The use and abuse of security concerns in excusing a
"nullification or impairment" of a contracting party's benefits under
the GATT.
(5) Differentiation between restrictions on imports and restrictions on exports pursuant to Article XXL
(6) The interpretation of Article XXI as a "waiver" clause additional to Article XXV.
(7) The issue of reference of political issues to the UN and
of the Contracting Parties declining to pass upon politically sensitive issues.

C.

Two GATT DISPUTES RAISING ARTICLE XXI ISSUES

The national security exception is of special relevance to U.S.
defence policies. This is because U.S. policies are directed at both
the interests of the United States and its allies. The United States
remains the fulcrum of Western defence policies. 83 It is not surprising then to find the United States as the respondent in the two
major GA TT disputes involving Article XXL The search is for cases,
subsequent interpretative or applicative agreements, and states
practice evidencing what states party to the GATT understand to
be the meaning of Article XXL
In the first case, very early in GATT history, Czechoslovakia
complained to the GATT Council that the United States was in violation of its GATT obligations because American export licences were
preventing certain exports to Czechoslovakia on a discriminatory
basis. The United States relied upon Article XXI to excuse the effective removal of MFN to Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the U.S. action was
a political statement aimed at the whole Soviet bloc. The Czechoslovakian government expressed concern at the tendency towards
autarky which a broad reading of Article XXI would involve. The

83. S ee, e.g., Report on the Effects of Oil Imports on National Security, Department
of Treasury, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,818 (1979). Within the report, see a letter from Robert B. Pirie,
Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRAEL), to the Honorable Robert
H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of Treasury (Feb. 26, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 18,828
(1979), that discusses an investigation of oil imports conducted under section 232(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Within the report, see also a letter from Richard N. Cooper,
Acting Secretary of State, to the Honorable Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of Treasury (Apr. 3, 1978), 44 Fed. Reg. 18,841 (1979).
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U.S. action was to be seen as an undue control based upon a pretext
of national security. 84
In the second case, by Presidential Proclamation No. 4941 of
May 5, 1982, the President of the United States imposed an import
quota on sugar. 85 Nicaragua was allocated a share of 2.1 percent
of the total imports by volume. This share was in line with
Nicaragua's market share for the period 1975-81. The quota took
effect on May 11, 1982. A year later on May 10, 1983, the Nicaraguan
quota was reduced from 58,000 short tons to 6,000 short tons. The
U.S. action was part of a policy of supporting the government of
El Salvador in a border dispute with Nicaragua. The economic sanction of cutting sugar imports from Nicaragua was designed to
weaken the regional influence of the leftist Nicaraguan government.
The difference was allotted to El Salvador, Honduras and Costa
Rica, nations which are not party to the GATT. Nicaragua unsuccessfully sought consultations with the United States and then complained under GATT Article XXIII that the United States had, by
its action, discriminated against Nicaragua and "nullified or impaired" Nicaragua's GATT benefits. The United States declined to
accept GATT jurisdiction over the matter. It saw the dispute as
politically sensitive and beyond the expertise of a technical economic
organisation.
By Presidential Proclamation No. 5104 of September 23, 1983,
a decision was implemented to further reduce the quota. Paragraph
four included the following statement: "I find [that] the additional
modifications of the quantitative limitations ... give due consideration to the interests in the United States' sugar market of domestic
producers and materially affected contracting parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." 86 Whether this opinion is well
grounded in the jurisprudence of the GA TT is examined in the
following discussion.
D.

THE DOCTRINE OF "GOOD FAITH" IN GATT JURISPRUDENCE

The important condition of "good faith" is too often glossed
over by commentators and becomes particularly relevant at the

84. GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.22 at 4 (June 8, 1949); cf, GATT Docs. CP.3/SR.20, CP.3/23,
CP.3/38, CP.3/39.
85. Proclamation No. 4941, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,661 (1982), reprinted in 96 Stat. 2740 (1982).
86. Proclamation No. 5104, 48 Fed. Reg. 44057 (1983), reprinted in 97 Stat._ (1983).
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margin of the law of peace. The interpreter should be wary of the
exercise of a legal right bestowed upon one constituent to the detriment of the communal whole. 87 Similarly, improper motive vitiates
the legitimacy of permitted conduct. 88 An interpretation which condones acts which endanger international peace and security or constitutes illegal force is not in good faith. Even though the definitions of these two limitations upon state sovereignty have proven
particularly elusive 89 a "good faith" interpretation of provisions such
as GA TT Article XXI require a limiting role to be recognised for
the "good faith" principle. 90 This is so that the exception should not
be validly invoked in support of action which makes a negative contribution to world peace.
International or national peace and security are not the primary
objects and purposes of a treaty concerned with the liberalisation
of trade. Recognising that the two concerns intersect, the treaty
provides for its own continuity in crisis circumstances. The simple
opening words of Article XXI can only be given a wide literal meaning at the expense of the object and purpose of the GATT. Article
XXI is an exception to and not a rule of GATT law. Permitting
unilateral interpretation without recourse to multilateral overview
may appear to be value-neutral. It would allow the exception to
emasculate the rules of a liberal trade order.
The International Court of Justice has been presented with
an opportunity to pass upon the good faith limitation to unilateral
interpretation of international law. In the Case of Certain Norwegian
Loans,91 Norway objected to the jurisdiction of the Court. She relied,
in part, upon the French declaration accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court which reserved from the Court's purview
matters "which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as
understood by the French government." 92 The Norwegian acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was limited by a, condition of
87. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 286-88
(2d ed. 1966).
88. Fur Seal Arbitration, 1 Moore's A r bitrations 875, 890 (1893); Iluyomade, The S cope
and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of R ight in International L aw, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47,
74 (1975).
89. S ee gener ally J . STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS (1977).
90. A ccord J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 295-97 (4th ed. 1949).
91. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (Judgment of July
6, 1957).
92. I d. at 21 (quoting the French Declaration).
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reciprocity. 93 Norway was therefore entitled to withdraw from the
Court's jurisdiction matters validly reserved therefrom by the
French. Pursuant to Article 36(6) of its statute, the Court was faced
with an enquiry into its own jurisdiction. By twelve votes to three,
the Court held for Norway. Nine of the majority judges delivered
a joint opinion which uncritically upheld the Norwegian objection.
However, Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht held the French acceptance to be illusory and of no legal effect because a state could not
validly accede to compulsory jurisdiction whilst withholding from
the Court the judicial power to delimit that jurisdiction.94 A similar
analysis pertained to other instruments of acceptance of jurisdiction, notably those of the United States, Mexico, Pakistan, India,
South Africa, Liberia and possibly the United Kingdom. 95 The
United Kingdom limited the subject matter of its reservation to
"national security." Nevertheless, if Judge Lauterpacht's analysis
is to be accepted, the U .K. reservation is also invalid because the
state rather than the Court is formally accorded the power to
delimit the scope of its own reservation. 96
The dissentients did not accept as legally valid such a
withholding, but preferred to uphold the validity of the French acceptance by construing it as subject to an ultimate judicial power
to delimit jurisdiction.97 Norway could not be understood to have
interpreted a legal document so as to give unreasonable or absurd
consequences to that document. 98
Judges Basdevant and Read (dissenting) applied the legal
presumption of good faith by inserting a sense of objectivity into
the reservation. The doctrinal differences reflect disagreement as
to the value of compulsory jurisdiction relative to unilateral interpretations of international law in achieving a peaceful evolution of
world public order. The majority did not enquire into the good faith
of the French reservation. Its rule was that a state may decide for
93. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(3), reprinted in [1972) Y.B.U.N.
1190.
94. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 l.C.J. at 44-48.
95. Id. at 62-63.
96. Id. at 63; see also id. at 67-69 (J. Guerrero, (dissenting).
97. Id. at 69 (J. Guerrero, dissenting). See id. at 71, 75-77 (J. Basdevant, dissenting);
id. at 79, 94-95 (J. Reed, dissenting).
98. Id. at 94. Accord Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.l.J. ser. B, No. 11, at
39 (Advisory Opinion of May 16, 1925); Competence of General Assembly regarding admission to the United Nations, 1950 l.C.J. 4, 8 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 3, 1950).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5

22

Knoll: International Economic Law

1984]

International Economic Law

589

itself what matters it will submit to third party or multilateral overview. Article XXI allows action which the acting state considers
necessary for its national security. While the action must be taken
in good faith, it is doubtful whether the element of good faith could
be made the subject of judicial review.
In the GATT context, the withholding of information which
contributes to trade liberalisatio~, albeit at some harm to national
security, will not always concord with the smooth, pacific alleviation of trade disputes. 99 In Articles XXII and XXIII, the GATT emphasises consultative dispute resolution. For the process to be effective, frank disclosures and full discussion of the issues is required.
Withholding information on security grounds ~an hinder this
process.
Similarly, clause (b) excepts action taken by a state subjectively
considered to be "necessary" for that state's self-protection. This
clause does not, on its face, admit action to assist an ally or action
which is desirable yet not necessary. The selection of these words
suggests that a state is to endeavour to act in the manner least
disruptive of international trade. Non-military emergencies, 100
defense supplies even in a non-weapons category 101 and the inputs
to the nuclear weapons cycle 102 are included in the subject matter
of this clause. States are given a broad scope for actions taken in
self-protection. A supplier of natural resources such as iron ore and
uranium would want to restrict supply to nations which might process these inputs for weapons manufacture and use the weapons
against the original supplier. 103
Finally, clause (c) excepts action mandated by the UN Security
Council and possibly the General Assembly 104 to keep peace. 105 The
example of sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 would fall into this
category. 106 Leaving such a broad exception for unilateral interpretation runs the risk that the exception will be invoked in a manner

99. GATT Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982).
100. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXl(b)(iii).
101. Id. art. XXl(b)(ii).
102. Id. art. XXl(b)(i).
103. Comments of the Australian Delegate, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR.40(2) at 9 (1947); U.N.
Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 at 24 (GATT travaux prepatoires).
104. JACKSON 1969, supra note 65, at 748.
105. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 36, 39-50.
106. See, e.g., 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/232 (1966).
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inconsistent with the object and purpose of the GATT and without
regard to the collective interest in international peace and security.
This risk is an Achilles heel of the GA TT.
Amending Part I of the GATT, which contains the MFN obligation of unanimity, 107 to allow single states to apply the principle only
at those times when a self-perceived threat to national security is
absent, seems overly permissive of unilateral suspensions of MFN.
Indeed, Article XXI does not literally prevent suspension or termination of MFN to states to which the perceived threat is not
sourced. This seems to be a particularly dangerous loophole. Nevertheless, the loophole persists. Such action, would, however, be an
impediment to attaining an objective of the GATT: trade on the
basis of MFN, and a valid basis for complaint under Article XXIII.
E.

THE SCOPE AND SUBJECT MATTER OF GATT ARTICLE XX!

The scope and subject matter of Article XXI was raised by
Czechoslovakia in the abovementioned complaint against the United
States. To Czechoslovakia, the subject matter of Article XXI was
"arms, ammunition and implements of war and other goods and
materials for purposes of supplying a military establishment" and
items of that genus. Because the U.S. definition of "war material"
covered all goods for which the significant disclosure requirements
for an export licence were not satisfied, it was argued by
Czechoslovakia to be too indefinite a condition to pass muster. The
commodities controlled were but 200 items of a list of 3,000 classified
exports. 108 The United States did not, in its reply, clarify its legal
definition of goods covered by Article XXL Still, at the twentysecond meeting of the Contracting Parties in 1949, the British,
Cuban, and Pakistani representatives all supported the U.S. position that the definition of goods in Article XXI covered dual-use
items (which could be diverted from peaceful to hostile uses) and
that that definition was a matter for each state to determine for
itself. 109
Czechoslovakia's commitment to free trade, being herself a
socialist rather than market economy, may be questionable. Nevertheless, the interpretation of Article XXI proferred by the

107. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXX.
108. GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.20 at 8.
109. Id. at 4.
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Czechoslovakian representative, Mr. Augenthalier, seems less conducive to autarky and disorder. 110 However, a more restrictive interpretation would be rendered unworkable without a commitment
from the militarily more powerful Western nations to objective
rules. In deciding against the Czech complaint, the approach taken
accorded the GATT no impact upon the development of pre-existing
law. Permitting each state to follow an autarkic security policy
without overview left the Article XXI exception open to abuse. The
floodgates had been opened. An element of entropy had been introduced into a system whose stability depended upon effective consultations to resolve disputes. GATT rules could effectively be
ignored on "security" grounds. On March 11, 1953, Peru restricted
imports from non-market economies as a political measure. Article
XXI was relied upon in support. 111 After lengthy consultations and
reviews, the decree was lifted on August l, 1967.112 The loophole
established by the earlier decision was given full play.
In 1959, the United States began limiting oil imports, ostensibly for national security reasons. 113 Though not raised in the GATT
context, the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba in 1962. 114 would also
seem to utilise the loophole.
At the sixteenth session of the Contracting Parties in 1960,
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Malaya and Australia reported
on the relaxation of import restrictions. 115 Restrictions maintained
under Articles XX and XXI were considered a distinct category
whose bounds remained beyond regulations and undefined. 116 A year
later, Ghana invoked Article XXI openly relying upon the loophole
which emerged from the United States-Czechoslovakia dispute. 117
Ghana considered that Portugal's involvement in the war in Angola
threatened peace in Africa. A perceived threat to African peace
was equated with a danger to the essential security interest of

110. Cf, McDougal, International Law and the Future, 50 Mrss. L.J. 259, 310-14 (1980).
111. GATT Doc. SR.9/27 at 10 (1955).
112. See GATT Doc. L/2844 (1967).
113. GATT Doc. L/1774 at 9 (May 21, 1962).
114. Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962), reprinted in 76 Stat. 1446 (1962).
115. GATT Doc. SR.16/5 at 56 et passim (June 13, 1960).
116. Id. at 56 (Mr. Jardine for the United Kingdom); id. at 57 (Mr. de Bruyne for the
Federation of Malaya).
117. GATT Doc. SR.19/12 at 196 (Dec. 12, 1961).
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Ghana. That the threat to Ghana was political more than military
was considered no objection to the validity of Ghana's invocation
of Article XXL Ghana did not, however, oppose the full membership in the GATT at that time being proposed for Portugal. The
view seems to have been taken by Ghana that bringing Portugal
into the GATT fold and applying Article XXI would be progressive
in both economic and political terms. The trend towards entropy
continued. In 1962, Australia declined to notify its restrictions on
ships as required by then residual-restrictions-reportingrequirements because these restrictions were "applied pursuant to
article XXL" 118
None of these claims were questioned or reviewed to test the
validity of the reliance on Article XXL Not until November 1982,
did the Contracting Parties as a whole recognise that the exception was in need of limitation. Initial procedural guidelines were
announced and a formal interpretation heralded. States were to be
"as fully informed as possible," "subject to the exception in clause
(a)" of action taken under Article XXL 119 The decision is significant
because it publicly noted the potentially disruptive effects of trade
restrictions grounded upon Article XXI. Being a first step, the decision was expressed in tentative, hortatory language. The pressure
to reverse the entropic effects of the now standing interpretation
of Article XXI has lately come to a head following the recently completed investigation of Nicaragua's complaint against U.S. import
restrictions on Nicaraguan sugar.
The Ministerial Declaration of 1982,120 which sought to dampen
the damages of the literal construction of Article XXI, was reportedly referred to by Nicaragua. Nicaragua would no doubt have construed the U.S. action as contrary to the spirit of that Declaration.
Although the Nicaragua-El Salvador border disturbances could
legitimately be viewed as a threat to the national security of El
Salvador, an ally of the United States, any threat to the United
States was, at most, remote. Article XXI permits a state to take
action with respect to "its essential security interest." 121 The protection of the interests of allies would not seem to ground invoca-

118.
119.
120.
121.

GA TT Doc. L/177 4 at 4 (May 21, 1962).
GATT Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982).
Id. at 295.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supa note 39, art. XXI (emphasis added).
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tion of the national security exception. An attempt to except intergovernmental agreements for military supply 122 did not survive
into the final text of the GATT. 123 Further, the subject-matter or
range of products to which Article XXI applies would need to be
tested. Sugar would seldom be even an indirect input into defence
preparedness. 124
Although the issue whether sugar was a commodity within the
subject-matter of Article XXI was not faced in the U.S.-Nicaragua
dispute before the GATT Panel, the U.S. position seems, at least
at first sight, to be over broad. In the context of U.S. restrictions
on the export of high technology, the EEC has protested that
"foreign policy" as opposed to "national security" restrictions are
contrary to the GA TT and also far from encouraging for the supporters of the market exchange mechanism in international trade. 125
Extrapolating from this, the EEC would consider the U.S. action
against Nicaragua similarly inexcusable.
The U.S. position provides quite an analytical challange. It cannot .be assumed that the American action was unjustifiable under
the GATT without further enquiry. One can but speculate as to
why Article XXI was not specifically invoked. The climate of U.S.Nicaraguan relations has been neither friendly nor peacful in recent times. To discover whether the GATT is intended to apply
in such an atmosphere, an examination of the travaux prepatoires
of the GATT rather inconclusively suggests that the exception is
limited to the subset of political disputes concerned with national
security. Arguably, that exception is the only legal excuse provided
for.
It is worth nothing that pre-GATT U.S. reciprocal trade
agreements generally contained exceptions for restriction of
military supply, emergency and military self-protection, and the

122. Report of the Joint Sub-committee, Fifth Committee: Inter-governmental Commodity Agreements and Sixth Committee: Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.5/14 and U.N.
Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/45 (1948); Comment of Australian Delegation, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12
at 24-5 91948).
123. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
124. Contra Comment of the Australian delegation, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 at 24-25;
see infra text accompanying note 136.
125. Aide-Memoire of the Commission of the European Communities and the Government of France presented to the U.S. Department of State, Apr. 28, 1983 at 2-3 and of Mar.
14, 1983 at 6.
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maintenance of neutrality. 126 These agreements influenced the U.S.
suggestion for an International Trade Organization (ITO) which was
made in September 1946, and included a draft charter which formed
a basis for the first draft of the Preparatory Committee of the UN
Conference on Trade and Employment. It included exception for
the "adoption or enforcement" of measures inter alia
c. relating to fissionable materials;
d. relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
e. in time of war or other emergency in international relations, relating to the protection of the essential security interests
of a Member; ....
k. undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United
Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security .127

In the Geneva draft of the Charter, produced at the Preparatory
Committee's second session in 1947, Article 94 entitled "General
Exceptions" included exceptions in the very terms of the ultimate
GATT Article XXl.1 28 Earlier that year the Drafting Committee had
prefaced the exceptions with the present opening words of Article
XX. 129 The same words were inserted into both the proposed ITO
Charter 130 and GATT 131 agreements. The records of the Preparatory
Committee show that the problem of interpreting subparagraph (e)
was raised by the Dutch delegate. The Committee Chairman, His
Excellency Erik Colban, suggested "that the spirit in which
Members of the Organisation would interpret these provisions was
the only guarantee against abuse." 132 Consensual rather than
126. See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of American and Mexico respecting
reciprocal trade, Dec. 23, 1962, 57 Stat. 833, art. XVIl(f), (g)(h), at 850 E.A.S. No. 311; Agreement and supplemental exchange of notes between the United States of America and Uruguay
regarding reciprocal trade, July 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 1624, art. XV(f) (g) and (h), at 1637-38,
E.A.S. No. 276.
127. Dept. of State, Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisation, Pub.
No. 2598, reprinted in The Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nation's Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc.E/PC/T/33 at 60.
128. See Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 at 56.
129. See generally Report of the Drafting Committee of the Prepatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference of Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T34 and Rev. 1.
130. Id. at 31, art. 37.
131. Id. at 77, art. XX.
132. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/33 at 3.
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unilateral regulation of the operation of the security exceptions was
not pursued at the meeting. At this stage, the exception for nondisclosure of security sensitive information was also added. 133
In 1948, a number of amendments to the exception were proposed to the Fifth and Sixth Committees. They were not expressed
in the final text. However, the record does not disclose whether
they were substantively rejected or simply put in the "too hard"
basket. They included: (1) A Joint Subcommittee of the Fifth and
Sixth Committees agreed to except intergovernmental agreements
for essential military supplies and the liquidation of military
stockpiles. 134 (2) Australia was concerned to see that any goods,
whether directly or indirectly used for military purposes, be
covered. The example given was iron ore, a raw material for most
weapons systems and for whose supply Australia was a major
source. 135 One might speculate whether, had the export of sugar been
considered the word "any" would have been qualified. 136 (3) Costa
Rica proposed to specifically exempt tariff readjustments made
necessary by currency fluctuations and to add an exception for the
maintenance of state monopolies. 137 This was withdrawn in the light
of discussion of other charter provisions. 138 (4) India proposed a broad
exception for state action in support of essential non-military,
political interests. The strained relations between India and the
Republic of South Africa were cited as a subject of the proposed
exception. 139 Iraq made a separate yet similar proposal. 140 (5) Egypt
sought specific exception for "severance of diplomatic relations or
existence of a state of belligerency ." 141 This was presumably

133. Id. at 4.
134. See generally Report of the Joint Sub-Committee, Fifth Committee: Intergovernmental Commodity Agreement; Sixth Committee: Organization U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.5/14
(1948) and U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/45 (1948); Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Sixth
Committee: Organization U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.5/93 (1948). The Australian delegation, in
particular, pressed for a wide exception covering supply to both a primary nation's defense
establishments and those of its allies. See Comment of the Australian delegation, supra note
124.
135. See Comment of the Australian Delegation, supra note 124.
136. See Comment of the Australian Delegation, supra note 125 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. See.Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc.E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 1 (1948).
139. See Comment of the Australian Delegation, supra note 124.
140. Iraq Amendment to Article 94 (General Exceptions) U .N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/C.6/12/Add.9 (1947).
141. Annotated Draft Agenda U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 at 26 (1947).
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designed to cover the gap in Arab-world relations with Israel. It
too was withdrawn prior to the establishment of the
subcommittee. 142
In reviewing the subcommittees' reports, M. de Gaiffier of
Belgium suggested that only military security rather than national
security should be the scope of the exception. 143 The French text,
"ordre Militaire," may have been read to suggest that military interference with trade was at the hub of the exception. This suggestion was quickly withdrawn following opposition from the British,
Chilean, American and Costa Rican delegates. 144 Poland on the other
hand opposed provision for unilateral measures for political reasons
in the commercial field. 145
The compromise in the final text is broader in scope than an
exception for military matters might be, but it does not extend to
political sanctions not primarily protective of the sanctioning nation's own security. The apparent confinement of the exception to
matters of only national security concerns confirmed by the travaux
prepatoires does not appear to have influenced the conduct of the
more powerful nations led by the United States. Without the support of dominant states, customary law, as regards both the
elements of usage and obligation necessary to giving a treaty norm
creating effect, does not appear to have crystallized. The travaux
prepatoires do not register a consensus upon the more closely
defined issues of Article XXL Although information flows, as well
as the movement of goods could be validly restricted, the limitation of scope and subject-matter to the subset of political issues
encapsulated in the description "national security" was not given
an element of specificity. Some states, notably Australia, saw the
relevant items of trade to which Article XXI could be applied rather
broadly. There was no decision to approach this definitional issue
on a multilateral basis. Nevertheless, the principle of multilateral
trade regulation does not automatically translate from peacetime
to periods of crisis.
The effect of hostilities upon the obligation to accord MFN
treatment has even recently been placed in the "too hard" basket
142. See Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 1 (1948).
143. Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting, Sixth Committee U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/C.5/SR.19 at 1 (1947).
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id. at 4.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5

30

Knoll: International Economic Law

1984]

International Economic Law

597

by the International Law Commission. 146 It seems that commercial
treaties generally do not survive a declaration of war. 147 This is so
because performance of obligations becomes impossible, or at least
of lower priority, than the war effort. Survival interests take
precedence. In a cold war situation, however, the climate is one of
crisis, but it is unlikely to involve survival interests in an objective sense. While states may struggle for influence over others in
the course of a cold war, their very survival as states is generally
not at risk. If national security is construed narrowly to mean such
survival, the Article XXI exception may not validly be invoked to
deal with cold war pressures. If, however, a wider construction is
to be preferred, GA TT obligations may validly be departed from
in dealing with cold war crises.
Given that the Protocol of Provisional Application permits
withdrawal from the GATT upon sixty days notice, non-withdrawal
from the GATT indicates a willingness to be bound by the GATT
upon the resolution of the crisis. So, on either approach to Article
XXI, it seems that GATT treaty obligations are designed to survive a cold war situation. The content of the rule during a cold war
does appear to have been flexibly interpreted. GATT obligations
have generally been modified but not abrogated in crises short of
war.
F. THE IMPACT OF SECURITY CONCERNS ON THE MOST
FAVOURED NATION OBLIGATION

In the Czechoslovakia-United States dispute, the United States
argued that Article XXI did admit the suspension of MFN. 148 The
Cuban and Pakistani delegates on the GATT Panel explicitly agreed
that Article XXI did admit suspension of MFN. 149 Czechoslovakia,
on the other hand, did not concede that security restrictions
necessarily had to be applied in a discriminatory manner.
The issue, not fully dealt with during the discussion in the
GATT, appears to be whether it is trade in certain products or trade

146. Report of the International Law Commission on its Thirtieth Session (1978] 2, Pt.
2, Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 71, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978). (Commentary to Draft Article 27
on the Most Favoured Nation Clause).
147. See J. STONE, supra note 23.
148. Contra GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.22 at 4-5.
149. Id. at 5 (Mr. Herrera-Arango of Cuba), at 6 (Mr. Hasnie of Pakistan).
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with certain countries, regardless of the products involved, which
is to be restricted in a valid exercise of Article XXL If the former,
then discriminatory restrictions are illegitimate. If the latter, they
are quite valid. The ultimate rejection of the Czech complaint
impliedly tilted the balance in favour of the latter view.
However, in view of the centrality of the MFN clause to the
GA TT and the absence of explicit decision on this point, the question cannot be said to have been resolved. The problem also bubbled
beneath the surface in the recent U.S.-Nicaragua dispute.
The reduction of Nicaragua's quota was an economic sanction
implemented for political reasons. It accorded Nicaragua treatment
less favourable than the United States Schedule of Concessions
under Article II of the GATT. Indeed, for the 1983-84 year,
Nicaragua had anticipated being able to ship 61,950 short tons to
the United States, its main export market. Worse still, GATT Contracting Parties shipping sugar to the United States now had a
relatively smaller share of the U.S. sugar market because the nations to which the Nicaraguan quota had been reallocated were not
party to the GATT. Although only 2.1 percent of U.S. imports, the
sugar trade was an important component of Nicaragua's export
trade. Among other arguments,1 50 a violation of Article XIII was
alleged.
Article XIII prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality
in applying quantitative restrictions. Even where quotas are imposed, MFN is upheld. Under the GATT every Contracting Party,
for any particular product, is to treat every other Contracting Party
as favourably as it does its most favoured trading partner. A single
tariff level is to apply to imports whatever their source. With
respect to quotas no foreign supplier is to suffer more than any
other as a result of the imposition of quotas.
Since the seventeenth century, MFN clauses have been included in commercial treaties. 151 MFN involves a claim to rights
available to another state whether or not that other state exercises
its entitlement. For when the Nicaraguan sugar quota was reallocated, GATT members could claim a right to treatment at least

150. Nicaragua also claimed violation of art. XI and Part IV of the GATT.
151. Report on the Most Favoured Nation Clause, [1978) 2, Pt. 1, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/309 (Nikolai Ushakov, Special Rapporteur). See McGOVERN, supra note
65, at 197.
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as favourable as that accorded to El Salvador, Honduras and Costa
Rica whether or not those states were, in fact, able to fill the
Nicaraguan quota. Had no such reallocation occurred, the MFN standard would not have shifted. Although the shift in the MFN standard has not resulted in claims by other GA TT parties, the reallocation, as a step additional to the cutback in the Nicaraguan quota,
does not appear to be a breach of MFN which is excusable under
Article XXL Reference to GATT obligations appears to have been
outweighed by political considerations in constructing the sanction.
The United States' focus was not upon restricting sugar imports as a means of safeguarding its national security, rather it was
upon reallocating a GATT member's quota to other suppliers whose
political bent was preferred by the United States. The United States
saw such a measure as beyond the jurisdiction of the GATT Contracting Party even though its fellow GATT members were losing
the benefits of MFN in the sugar trade. As a precedent, the actions of the United States are not conducive to healthy operation
of the MFN principle.

G. THE SETTLEMENT OF GATT DISPUTES INVOLVING SECURITY
CONCERNS
This section examines the relationship between GATT Articles
XXI and XXIII. Can an action excusable under Article XXI nevertheless constitute a "nullification or impairment" for which a GATT
remedy is to be had? Phrased differently, does the valid invocation of Article XXI excuse the invoking state from compliance with
GATT dispute resolution mechanisms? At the Geneva sessions
drafting the charter for the proposed ITO, the answer was that action taken to protect the national security could give rise to a
remediable complaint. 152 After all, restriction of exports to a target
state forces the target to pay more for its imports by virtue of the
volume of available supply falling relative to demand. Restriction
of imports from a target results in the target being paid less for
its exports as demand falls relative to the available supply. Cutting off finance or aid to a target state reduces the target's ability
to develop its own industries. Unable to produce at home, the target
becomes dependent on supply from abroad.
However, just as Rhodesia circumvented most of the economic
sanctions placed upon it for over a decade, so can most target states
152. E/PC/T/A/SR.33 at 5; see also
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mitigate, but not wholly escape, the ill effects of actions taken pursuant to Article XXI.1 53 The availability of mitigation does not
negative a legal claim of "nullification or impairment." Also, it matters little to the affected state that exports or imports are the subject of unwarranted action. Unilateral restrictions for national
security reasons may seldom be anticipated by the target state. 154
Whether or not excusable under Article XXI, the target, as in the
case of Nicaragua discussed above, can usually show a primafacie
nullification or impairment. The use of quantitative restrictions or
a violation of a GATT obligation shifts the burden of providing
damage away from the target state.
The sanctioning state needs to then excuse its action. 155 In the
U.S.-Nicaragua sugar dispute, the United States elected not to
follow this procedure but rather declined to accept the jurisdiction
of the GA TT Panel over an action taken for security reasons. The
Panel felt duty bound to find in Nicaragua's favour. It did not condone the U.S. stance of declining the GATT's jurisdiction in a case
where an overt economic measure violated a GATT obligation.
In the Czechoslovakia-U.S. case, the United States did defend
its sanctions which did not so much ban exports as place a heavy
administrative burden on persons seeking an export licence. The
complainant state, faced with the respondent's reliance on Article
XXI, has little by way of relief to look forward to until the crisis
has passed.
To the Czech claim that the information requested by the officials administering the export controls had been supplied, the
Cuban representative on the Panel replied that the rigour and
stringency of those officials was not a ground for complaint to the
GATT. The appellate procedures of U.S. law were designed to constrain excesses. 156 Any misapplication of the controls to goods
neither imported into Czechoslovakia for war purposes (nor otherwise covered by Article XXI) should be the subject of further direct
153. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
29-30 (1983).
154. See Report adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties on Apr. 3, 1950 on The
Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, pursuant to a complaint by Chile, GATT Doc.
DP.4/39, II BISD 188 (1952), Report adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties on Feb. 26,
1955 on Swedish Anti-dumping Duties, pursuant to a complaint by Italy, GATT Doc. L/428,
3 BISD 81 (1955).
155. See JACKSON 1969, supra note 65, at 182.
156. E/PC/T/A/SR.33 at 5.
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negotiations between the United States and Czechoslovakia rather
than of a GATT investigation. 157
The rigorous manner in which U.S. export controls are enforced
has continued to cause concern in the international arena. The pending amendments to the Export Administration Act 158 have met with
sharp criticism from both inside and outside the United States. For
example, the EEC has protested the "negative implications ... for
international trade" of the proposed increase in the administrative
burden upon .holders of export licences. 159 Governmental interference
with technological data flows has drawn criticism from the scientific community. 160 A heightened intensity of customs inspections
under the export controls of "Operation Exodus" has done little
to enamour customs officials to American business. 161
In contributing to the GA TT Panel discussion of the Czech
claim against the United States, the United Kingdom representative
hedged, arguing that "every country must have the last resort on
questions relating to its own security. On the other hand, the Contracting Parties should be cautious not to take any step which might
have the effect of undermining the General Agreement." 162 The decision of the Contracting Parties was that the United States "had
not failed to carry out its obligations under the Agreement through
its administration of the issue of export licences." 163 So, it seems
that rigorously enforced licence procedures may withstand a complaint that they constitute a nullification or impairment. 164
The U.S. Department of Commerce has recognised that "should
the security exception by invoked, it could not necessarily foreclose
a successful challenge under Article XXIII by G.A.T.T. members
claiming impairment of tariff concessions." 165 The Commerce Department view may not represent the U.S. viewpoint if and when the
157. Id. at 6-7.
158. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 Cong. Rec. S4183 (1983); and S.979, 129 Cong.
Rec. H3660.
159. See Aide-Memoire, supra note 42.
160. See, e.g., Zonderman, Policing High-Tech Exports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 100 passim.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 156, at 7.
163. Id. at 9.
164. At least insofar as the GATT discussion and decision influence future decisions.
165. United States Department of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Nuts, Bolts and
Large Screws on the National Security (Feb. 1983) at 57.
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GATT Contacting Parties require the United States to offer compensation for action excusable, yet causing a nullification or impairment of GATT benefits to other members. However, the United
States does not have the domestic legal authority to pay
compensation. 166
H. DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

From the perspective of a state on the receiving end of sanctions, the principles involved are to be viewed similarly for export
controls and for import controls. 167 Although the economic
parameters differ, the legal limits to Article XXI action will differ
little between import and export restraints.
Where export controls are in place, they are generally applied
to goods for which demand exceeds supply. To be effective, a
withholding of exports cannot afford to be mitigated from alternative sources of supply. Being a major supplier of high technology
items in ever increasing demand around the world, the United
States can use restrictions on the export of "know-how" to pressure
other states. This is particularly so in cases where the U.S. need
for export markets is exceeded by overseas demand for U.S. knowhow. Where an import control is applied, an excess of supply over
demand is conducive to effectiveness. The glut in world sugar
markets also aided U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua.

I.

WAIVER OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO PROTECT SECURITY

GATT Article XXV allows the Contracting Parties to waive
any GATT obligation in exceptional circumstances not otherwise
provided for. A two-thirds majority of votes cast which must include over half the GATT membership is required to approve a
waiver. Waivers may be for a limited duration but need not be. 168
In 1951, the United States suspended MFN towards the Soviet
bloc states, an action broader than the earlier restriction of export
licences. On this occasion, the Contracting Parties ruled that the
U.S. and Czech Governments "shall be free to suspend, each with
respect to the other, the obligations of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade." 169 This ruling would seem to reflect the classical
166. Id. at 57.
167. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
168. See e.g., Waiver to the United States regarding the restrictions under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 3 BISD 32 (1955); cf GATT Doc. L/339, 3 BISD 141 (1955).
169. GATT, II BISD 36 (1952).
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legal position wherein the only regulation of international economic
sanctions was each state's desire to be seen as a good faith participant in its relations with other states. The ruling operated as a
waiver of U.S. GATT obligations to Czechoslovakia but did not conform to GA TT Article XXV(5).
It does seem that the waiver authority in GATT Article XXV
was not invoked because of some parties' doubts as to the very
relevance of the GATT to a political dispute. The cold war atmosphere
clearly pervaded the matter and the GA TT Panel's investigation.
A similar climate surrounded the U.S.-Nicaragua dispute before the
GA TT Panel in 1983-84.
Differing from the Panel's approach in the dispute between the
United States and Czechoslovakia, even an informal waiver of GATT
obligations as between the United States and Nicaragua, was not
examined by either the Panel or Contracting Parties. This difference
may have been influenced by the Ministerial Declaration of
November 30, 1982. 110 The initial step back towards multilateral
rather than bilateral or unilateral interpretive mechanisms having
been made, the Contracting Parties did not desire to condone a sanction of doubtful legality. Perhaps a more limited role for waiver
of GATT obligations, even if outside the lines of Article XXV(5),
is in the offing. One that recognises that the waiver should indeed
be limited to exceptional circumstances not otherwise provided for
in, for example, Article XXL
J.

JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSE ES EN ATTERNATIVE TO ARTICLE XX!

If one were to apply the law on self-preservation in the economic

arena, the legal reasons why the United States viewed its action
as justifiable would need to be based upon an illegal act by
Nicaragua validly construed as opposable to the United States. The
U.S. redistribution of Nicaragua's sugar quota then would be areasonable proportionate reprisal. Dr. Alan Gerson, for example, has
argued that because Nicaragua was engaged in the subversion of
El Salvador, there is an illegal act to which El Salvador may validly
respond with U.S. assistance. The legality of the U.S. action is derived
from the legality of the El Salvadoran response. 171

170. GATT Doc. L/5426.
171. Gerson, U.S. Acts Lawfully, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at A31, col. 1.
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The U.S. action involved both military measures, such as involvement with the laying of mines in Nicaraguan ports, and
economic measures, such as the restriction of sugar imports. As
to the former, the matter has been partially litigated before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The United States chose not
to rely upon its reservation to ICJ jurisdiction, known generally
as the Conolly Amendment. 172 This is surprising, given the Court's
approval of this type of reservation in the Franco-Norwegian Loans
Case. 173 Instead, an abortive attempt was made to modify the
American acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction. The ICJ did not pass upon
the validity of this modification in ordP-ring, as a preliminary
measure, the cessation and non-resumption of the blocking of or
endangering access to Nicaraguan ports by the United States. 174 The
ICJ has not declared the U.S. action to be an illegal use of force.
The Court did reaffirm the principles applicable to the use of force
and recommended against further action which might aggravate
the dispute. 175 The United States claimed it had already ceased the
mining and declared its intention to abide by the ruling. 176 It has
also continued to support El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras
in their dispute with Nicaragua. Notably these are the very states
to whom the Nicaraguan sugar quota was "reallocated." The support has continued to include military and economic measures.
Before the GATT Panel the United States argued that because
its action was not economically motivated, the dispute could not
be resolved within the field of relations covered by the GATT.
Arguments with respect to the discriminatory nature of the restrictions were reserved by the United States. The Panel found that
the U.S. action constituted illegal discrimination and concluded that
the United States was in breach of its obligations having violated
GA TT Article XIII. It did not decide the other issues raised by
Nicaragua. The effect of both the GATT Panel and ICJ findings,
contrary to American submissions, has not been a cessation of U.S.
involvement nor a return to stability in the region. In the present
172. See 1978-1979 I.C.J.Y.B. 56 (1979).
173. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. 9. For a discussion of this case see
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
174. Text of World Court's Ruling on Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984, at A9, col. 1.
175. Id.
176. Court's Ruling Acceptable, State Department Declares, id. at A8, col. 1.
T178. Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc.E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 3-4 (1948).
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absence of a ruling by the ICJ upon the ultimate legitimacy of U.S.
involvement, one can conclude only that the GATT Contracting Parties consider the U.S. in violation of at least its GATT obligations.
The overall legality of its action may also fall under a cloud given
the thrust of the provisional measures adopted by the ICJ.
Insofar as an economic body was not an appropriate forum, the
American submissions derive some support from the GATT travaux
prepatoires, in particular, the records of the Subcommittee of the
Fifth and Sixth Committees dealing with this question. The Subcommittee was overall of the view that political matters including
politically motivated economic measures were within the jurisdiction of the UN, the jurisdiction of which the proposed ITO ought
not interfere. 177 Although regulation of such measures through the
proposed ITO was disavowed, regulation by the United Nations was
considered by the Subcommittee to be preferable to unilateral
governance. 178
In the Sixth Committee, the Subcommittee's position was the
subject of some debate. The Australian, Belgian and Swedish
delegates considered that the ITO should not be left without capacity to act upon economic measures taken for political reasons where
the UN did not or would not involve itself. 179 The delegates of the
United Kingdom, Greece, the United States, South Africa, Iraq and
India argued that a technical, economic organisation ought to decline
jurisdiction over political matters. Indeed, Mr. Holloway of South
Africa remarked, "[i]f an economic measure which led to a complaint
was related to a political dispute which was itself not important
enough to come before the United Nations, there was a presumption that the political aspects of the dispute were not significant." 180
Perhaps the essence of the debate is best summarised in the
remark of Mr. Paiva of Brazil. He suggested that declining jurisdiction for the ITO provided a pragmatic and generally acceptable solution for states most concerned with the problem. 181 These nations
could not be coerced to submit to a jurisdiction upon whose

177. Report of Subcommittee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 3-4 (1948).
178. Statement of the Chairman of the Sub-Committee I U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/104.
179. See Summary Record of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting, Sixth Committee U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/C/6/SR at 3-5, (1948).
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id. at 5.
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parameters agreement could not be reached. Even so, these differences of opinion related directly to the ITO, which was stillborn.
The GATT has become a reluctant replacement. Not all states are
willing to submit security concerns to multilateral regulation. The
powerful nations reserve unto their unilateral governance a
category of political questions which is broader than the exception
ultimately granted for "security" measures. Yet the exception for
intergovernmental security arrangements between allies did not
survive through to the ultimate text of the GATT. The non-provision
for excepting the actions of allies to protect each other's security
cannot be taken to involve a prohibition of such actions. The position of the more powerful states was that an ITO ought to decline
to decide political questions. This stance effectively vetoed the
evolution of a customary norm of prohibition and left the interpretative problems of Article XXI to remain unresolved in the
GA TT context.
K.

THE FUTURE OF ARTICLE XX!

States practice under Article XXI is in a parlous condition. The
warning given by Professor Jackson in 1969 still rings true:
The existence of practice that is inconsistent with legal rules, particularly when such divergent practice results in profit of one kind
or another, usually increases the incentive for other departures
from the rule and, therefore, the number of other departures. Consequently, one of the values of a legal rule - the enhancement of
stability and predictability- is lost. 182

The value of Article XXI in stabilising the trade liberalisation process even when the security of trading nations is threatened has
depreciated ever since the last cold war. The de facto waiver of
GATT obligations as between Czechoslovakia and the United States
may have been a pragmatic solution for the times. Jurisprudentially,
it opened the floodgates for unilateral actions which are only ostensibly excusable under Article XXL
Having sought a wider forum than the economic institution into
which the GATT evolved, the U.S.-Nicaragua dispute went before

182.

JACKSON

1969, supra note 65, at 757.
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the International Court of Justice. In an expeditiously rendered interim decision, this forum subtly condemned the military action of
the United States in the dispute. So, on two fronts, the United
States has been found wanting in the eyes of the law. Arguments
which present the U.S. actions as legitimate reprisals have been
put forth by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam. 183 These
arguments were not developed before the GA TT Panel, nor did they
form the basis of the U.S. case before the ICJ. The United States
was unwilling to submit its actions to either the GATT Panel or
judicial scrutiny.
In the immediate post-World War II period, the United States
provided constructive leadership in espousing the value of rules
for dealing with environmental, telecommunications, human rights,
economic and security issues. Nations with diverse economic structures were persuaded of the mutual benefits in developing convergent policies. 184 The United States remains a world leader. By
not relying upon the very principles it helped develop to justify
or excuse its actions, the system of rules is weakened. As the example of a leading nation showing disregard for legal forums is
followed by others, divergent policies emerge and entropy sets in.
The U.S. position has been heavily criticised even within the United
States. 185
A sense of vulnerability is fostered when the leading market
economy prefers protection of traditional values to the gains from
trade. The resurgence of reciprocity as a key trade mechanism for
the United States may well be in the offing. Contemporaneous with
introverted national policies is the intermediate state of nature between war and peace. Introversion, protectionism and a cold war
climate seem to feed upon one another while awaiting a superior
initiative to break the cycle and restore an open world economy
and peace. Realisation of the consequences of a deteriorating
political climate often provides the impetus for reversal of the process of entropic autarky.

183. Tolchin, U.S. Aide Defends Mining Without Acknowledging It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12,
1984, at AlO, col. 1; cf; Ledeen, When Security Preempts the Rule of Law, N.Y. Times, Apr.
16, 1984, at A21, col. 1.
184. Nimitz, Respect World Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1984, at Al9, col. 2.
185. See id. Ullman, World Court Evasion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at A27, col. l,
Tolchin, supra note 183 (giving a summary of American Congressional opinions).
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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

A. NATIONAL SECURITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE IMF

In making a comparison of GATT practice with the practice
of the IMF, it is important to remember that, although the institutions were conceived together, they have generally engaged in little
visible cooperation. The conventional wisdom that trade and
payments problems should be kept as distinct as possible appears
to have survived repeated challenge. 186
The IMF is designed to regulate the actions of governments
affecting exchange rates. It has three tiers in its structure. The
Board of Governors, upon which all member states are represented,
usually meets annually. This Board delegates most of its powers
to the Executive Directors, known collectively as the Executive
Board, who are responsible for the general operations of the IMF.
The Managing Director and his staff conduct the daily operations
of the IMF.
The Articles of the International Monetary Fund have become
the governing norms of international monetary law. Under Article
VIIl(2)(a), currency restrictions upon current international transactions require IMF approval. The decision is one for the Executive
Board of the Fund. 187 This Executive Board may be viewed as the
Fund's key administrator, beneath the Board of Governors whose
role is more one of policy-making. The Board of Governors passes
by-laws with which the decision of the Executive Board must be
consistent. 188 The Executive Board usually acts by consensus. Formal votes, if taken, require a simple majority of weighted votes
cast. 189
The imposition of restrictions for national security reasons
came before the Board as the cold war between the United States
and the Soviet Union built up in the 1950's. Whereas the Fund was
responsible for currency restrictions even if not adopted for balance
of payments reasons, it recognised its own lack of expertise in
186. See, e.g., CLINE, Introduction and Summary, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's 13 (1983).
187. 1.M.F. BY-LAWS s.15 (36th issue, 1979).
188. J. GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 5 (1980) (IMF
Pamphlet Series No. 32).
189. Weighting is by a quota that is measured by contribution to the Fund and arguably
proportionate to the perceived relative prominence of each nation's currency. See generally
J. GOLD. VOTING MAJORITIES IN THE JUND (1977) (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 20).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5

42

Knoll: International Economic Law

1984)

International Economic Law

609

evaluating security issues. The solution arrived at is contained in
Executive Board Decision No. 144-(52/51). 190 Pursuant to this decision, member countries imposing currency restrictions for security reasons are required to notify the Fund not later than thirty
days after imposition of the restrictions. Unless the Fund raises
an objection within thirty days thereafter, the restriction is treated
as approved, retrospective to the date of notification. The approval
is effective for an indefinite time period. By contrast, restrictions
taken for economic reasons are usually .only approved for limited,
yet renewable periods.
In December 1950, prior to Decision 144-(52/51), the United
States notified the IMF of the imminent restriction of certain
payments and transfers to China, North Korea and their nationals.
Offering the opinion that the legality of the move was not for the
IMF to decide, the United States made clear its disinclination to
accept IMF regulation of its action. In 1951, Cuba notified the IMF
of politically motivated restrictions of its own. The IMF adopted
Decision 144-(52/51) to protect its political neutrality without abdicating its regulatory duties in a cold war crisis climate. It effectively condoned the U.S. and Cuban restrictions.
Article VIIl(2)(b) makes restrictions approved under Article
VIIl(2)(a) enforceable in the territories of any other member. So,
whereas Article XXI of the GATT excuses defensive sanctions legally effective only to the extent of the claimant state's jurisdiction,
this jurisdictional limit is overcome in the IMF context by giving
approved restrictions international enforceability. The operation
of this Article became the focus of world attention during the Iranian assets freeze imposed by the United States. The freeze provides
a useful vehicle for the analysis of the impact of security concerns
upon international monetary law. The facts behind the legal struggle are worth recounting.
In response to the taking hostage of U.S. diplomats in Iran and
in anticipation of attempts by Iran to undermine the strength of
the U.S. dollar in international markets, the United States Department of the Treasury, on November 14, 1979, froze all transactions
in U.S. dollars to which the government of Iran and its subsidiary

190.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
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units, including the central bank, were party .191 The central bank,
Bank Markazi Iran, commenced litigation in London and Paris to
force banks outside the United States to release Iranian U.S. dollar
deposits to Bank Markazi. The correct construction of Article
VII(2)(b) would have been at issue. The issues, however, were
rendered moot by the successful mediation of Algeria in the
dispute. 192 Iranian funds were released in exchange for the hostages.
B. IMF REVIEW OF THE SECURITY EXCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW

Sir Joseph Gold, Senior Consultant and formerly General
Counsel and Director of the Legal Department of the IMF, considers
any measure which directly regulates international monetary
payments or transfers to be within the scope of Article VIII(2)(b). 193
Indeed, UN mandated actions are cited as measures within the scope
of the Article. 194 In 1979, the IMF approved a loan to Nicaragua.
The Honorable Henry F. Reuss, Chairman of the Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, United States House of
Representatives, criticised the decision for failing to take into account its political consequences. Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal supported the decision of the U.S. appointed Executive Director who voted in favour of the loan. Political considerations are not
to be taken into account by the IMF whose international standing
depends in part upon its non-interference in the political affairs of
its member states. 195 Secretary Blumenthal wrote:
Members cannot be expected to fulfill their obligations to the l.M.F.
and to the international community if their rights can be denied
191. The regulations as first promulgated appear at 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979) and as
amended at 45 Fed. Reg. 45,594 (1980). They were "lifted" to conform with and implement
the Algeria-U.S.-Iran settlement on Feb. 24, 1981 retroactive to Jan. 19, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg.
14,330 (1981).
192. See Agreement on the Release of the American Hostages, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. No.
2047 (Feb. 1981); Settlement of the Iran Hostage Crisis: Official Documents, 75 AM. J. INT'L
L. 418 (1981); Iran-United States Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981).
193. See, e.g., Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XV, 27 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 601,
612-17 (1980).
194. Id. See also GOLD, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XIV, 26 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS
609 (1979).
195. J. GOLD, supra note 189, at 59. This consideration is made explicit in art. IV(lO) of
the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("the World Bank"). See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, done Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
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them on political grounds. The prospect of a smoothly functioning
world economy, with responsible international behaviour in terms
of economic and financial policy by I.M.F. member governments,
would be greatly lessened. All nations would lose by the introduction of political disputes into the I.M.F ., and it would be a particularly grave error for the United States to lead the way. 196

Although the thrust of Secretary Blumenthal's view would
seem to require that politically tainted disputes be not resolved
by the IMF, its result was not a "hands-off" approach by the IMF.
Rather, there evolved a concrete decision to apply the standing tests
to Nicaragua's loan application. These tests were of economic performance criteria only. The decision had undeniable political consequences just as inaction might have had. Nevertheless, it was a
politically value-neutral application of legal rules which enhanced
the IMF's statute as an international organisation actively pursuing the goals of its charter. 197 Sir Joseph Gold's analysis of Article
VIII continues to be followed by the IMF .198
Some academic commentators have supported a "hands off"
approach. They argue that a control designed to pressure a foreign
government into a policy shift rather than to ballast the currency
of the state imposing the control is not "an exchange control regulation" within the meaning of Article VIII(2)(b). 199 They argue that
the IMF is only concerned with actions taken to protect a currency from destabilising exchange fluctuations and not actions taken
for other reasons. This view remains a minority view.
Curiously, Decision 144-(52/51) was taken in the same cold war
pressures that surrounded the adoption of a different and more permissive approach by the GATT in the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute. 200
By adopting objective criteria and ignoring the attempt to avoid
196. House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Blumenthal, Replies to Congressman Reuss' Criticism of IMF Loan to Nicaragua, News Release (Washington, D.C., June
13, 1979).
197. GOLD, supra note 188, at 66-67.
198. Letter from George P. Nicoletopoulos, Director, Legal Department, International
Monetary Fund to Professor Richard W. Edwards J., Professor of Law, University of Toledo
(Jan. 9, 1981), reprinted in 75 AM. J. lNT'L L. 900-02 (1981).
199. F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 444-45 (3d. ed. 1971) Krispis, Money in Private
International Law, 120 A.D.l.R.C. 191, 293 (1967); Recent Development, The Iranian Assets

Control Regulations and the International Monetary Fund: Are the Regulations "Exchange
Control Regulations?" 4 B.C. lNT'L COMP. L. REV. 203 (1981).
200. Compare the GATT Panel's approach in the later U.S.-Nicarague sugar dispute.
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what was then still a new world of international economic law, IMF
practice has promoted respect for its norms. The effectiveness of
the norms depends upon the extent to which members are convinced
that the norms promote their interests. The strength of Decision
144-(52/51) lies in the clear procedure, consensually developed, for
obtaining IMF approval with respect to restrictions prompted by
security concerns. Nations seeking to enforce international currency
restrictions enacted for security reasons are obliged to place the
restrictions before Executive Board scrutiny for thirty days. The
importance of such an obligation is explained by Sir Joseph Gold:
If it is agreed that states are reluctant to incur international odium
as a violator of obligations, a conclusion can be drawn for the formulation of obligations. The greater the precision that can be given
to obligations, the less likely members will be to engage in conduct in violation of them. The violation of a precise obligation will
be obvious, and members will have little or no opportunity to argue
that a violation is not occurring. 201

More subtly, international lending creates a dependancy bond
between debtor and creditor. A comfortable monetary position protects a state from the influence of others. During the Suez crisis
in 1956, Egypt, the Untied Kingdom and the United States
restricted payments and transfers without notifying them to the
IMF. British involvement in the unsuccessful military action to
reopen the Suez ceased after the selling pressure against her currency was compounded by the refusal of the United States to defend the pound. 202 The United States was the one nation financially able to stabilise the pound in the absence of IMF approval. The
United States deference to the IMF process sealed the fate of the
pound. In the absence of IMF approval, Britain was unable to legally
seek and obtain international cooperation for her restrictions. Her
monetary position weakened: external influences had greater impact
than would have otherwise been the case. 203 It may be that expectation of non-approval was one factor influencing the United
Kingdom not to seek approval for its 1956 actions.
201. J. Gow. supra note 189, at 32.
202. H. THOMAS, SUEZ 146-47 (1967).
203. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 117,
287-88, 337 (1957); Favcett, The International Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 32, 65 (1964).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5

46

Knoll: International Economic Law

1984]

International Economic Law

613

The IMF loan to Nicaragua in 1979 was opposed in Congress
partly in the hope of placing Nicaragua in a dependency relation
with the United States for the key currency of trade, the U.S. dollar.
By making itself the creditor of Nicaragua, the IMF made Nicaragua
dependent instead upon an apolitical lender.
In the case of the Iranian assets freeze, it had been widely
publicized in the press that strategic withdrawals of U.S. dollar
deposits around the world by Iran were being planned with the
stated purpose of undermining the U.S. dollar. 204 Protecting against
this not only safeguarded the U.S. currency, but prevented a
destabilisation of international monetary relations. The United
States was not so much making Iran dependent upon its political
foes for cash flow, but rather maintaining the stability of a world
peace geared for U.S. dollar payments.
No analogy can be borne with the imposition of sugar quotas
against Nicaragua by the United States contrary to GATT Article
XIII. That action was not conducive to the furtherance of friendly
relations or at least not focal thereto. The standard for good faith
action is necessarily a loose one. Still, the British currency restrictions during the Suez crisis and the U.S. sugar quota restriction
are less persuasively conducive to international peace and security than the Iranian assets freeze.
Following World War II, the Eurodollar market evolved at least
partly due to fears of an assets freeze in the then prevailing cold
war climate. Governments of both East and West declined to keep
their U.S. dollar funds in the names of their governments or central banks in New York. 205 By diversifying the location of their
deposits, governments reduced the risk that an assets freeze by
any one state would undermine their overall dealings. The failure
of the revolutionary authorities in Iran to learn this lesson left the
stage open for the crisis in international monetary law in 1979-81.
The Iranian assets freeze required IMF approval because Article VIII(3) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF involves the
proscription of discriminatory currency restrictions. Article XIX(i)
includes within the proscription:
204. Pardieu, The Carter Freeze Order: Specific Problems Relating to the International
Monetary Fund, 9 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 97, 98 n.13 (1981).SeealsoAmerica'sBloodApproachesBoiling Point, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1979, at 27.
205. Berlioz, The Iranian Crisis: The Implication for International Financial Law, 1
INT'L CoNTRACT-L. FINANCE REv. 10, 11 (1980).
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[P]ayments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital,
and ... without limitation:
(1) All repayments due in connection with foreign trade,
other current business, including services, and normal short-term
banking and credit facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from
other investments;
(3) Payments of moderate amounts for amortization of loans
of for depreciation of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses. 206

Lump sum repatriation of capital arguably falls outside IMF
regulation. 201 Nevertheless, insofar as the Iranian assets freeze went
beyond capital controls, it would seem that without IMF approval,
its discriminatory nature would render it inconsistent with the Articles of the IMF and, therefore, needing to be approved to be a
restriction internationally enforceable under Article VIIl(2)(b).
C. THE SETTLEMENT OF MONETARY DISPUTES INVOLVING
SECURITY CONCERNS

The concept of "nullification of impairment" in the GATT does
not appear in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Also, the procedure of exhausting consultations prior to a Panel investigation
and s~bsequent decision of the Contracting Parties is not copied.
Article XVIII of the Articles of Agreement gives the IMF power
to interpret its own law where a dispute arises. Unlike the GATT,
the emphasis is on action by the IMF as regulator rather than simply on facilitation of settlement between disputant states. It is the
responsibility of the IMF to promote international monetary
cooperation and collaboration on international monetary problems 208
through a permanent institution.
In institutionalising the regulatory process, the IMF has the
power to tolerate or even condone illegal behavior whilst taking
action to maintain or, in some cases, restore stable relations. This

206. Article of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 at art. XIX(i) (came into force on
Dec. 27, 1945, by acceptance).
207. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 541 (56/39) (1958), cited in Pardieu, supra note
204 at 99; J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
13 (1956) (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 3).
208. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 206, art. l(i).
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centralised interpretative and decision-making power takes the
member states one step away from having an immediate influence
on the granting of approval for security based currency restrictions.
Not only are states more willing to submit to an impartial authority than a forum of other partial states, but the institution, in maintaining its impartiality, will be influenced by considerations other
than particular national sensitivities.

D.

THE

IMF IN A

COLD WAR

Although the IMF does not have power to suspend the operation of all of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement, if an
emergency arises or unforeseen events threatening the activities
of the IMF prevent member nations from observing their obligations, the provisions imposing the obligations can be suspended from
operation. Substitute rules can be adopted to deal with or adapt
to the changed circumstances. It is IMF action rather than unilateral
action which is the protective measure. Such suspension is to be
distinguished from a waiver. A waiver is selective, applying only
to certain member nations. It excuses otherwise violative conduct.
A suspension applies to all member nations and removes the need
for a member nation to excuse its action. 209
The IMF also tolerates action which is legally invalid. For example, during the 1970's, there was an absence of consensus on
whether the IMF should have authority to condone floating exchange rates, the rule then being fixed exchange rates. Violative
action, particularly by the United States, was seen as an attempt
to induce legal change. That change came with the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. 210 This preference for centralised
rather than unilateral decision-making is in contrast to the
mechanism practised under the GATT in Articles XIX, XX and
XXL Unilateral action is the exception which became a rule in
GATT practice. Both institutions are intended to survive a cold war
albeit by different mechanisms.
In the three major cases brought to its attention under Decision 144-(52/51), the IMF has approved the restrictions imposed. In
one case approval was not sought and the restrictions then

209. J. GOLD, supra note 188 at 35-38.
210. In place on or before Nov. 30, 1983, cited in J.H. JACKSON 1983 SUPPLEMENTARY
NOTES AND MATERIALS 31 (1983) (of use with JACKSON 1977, supra note 65).
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imploded. In 1950, the United States restricted the making of
payments and transfers to the People's Republic of China. Cuba
adopted similar restrictions in 1951. After the adoption of Decision
144-(52/51), these restrictions were approved retroactively. In the
absence of objection from another member, the IMF did not evaluate
the claim that security concerns were involved. In the 1960's pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 221, 211 232, 212 and 253, 213
restrictions imposed by members with respect to Rhodesia were
approved by the IMF .214 They were lifted upon the recognition of
Zimbabwe in 1979.215 When given the opportunity to do so, the IMF
will defer to UN expertise in security matters.
These approvals, along with the approval for the Iranian assets
freeze, need to be contrasted with situations in which approval was
not sought. One can but speculate whether apprehension of disapproval led to any decisions not to seek approval. During the 1956
dispute over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by
Egypt, Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States
established restrictions, but did not seek approvals. The United
Kingdom's action, in particular, foundered 216 confidence in the British
pound causing it to drop in correlation with British handling of the
Suez affair and the violation of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
More recently, some nations applying economic sanctions for
political reasons against South Africa and Israel have not sought
approval. Although the IMF has not adopted a definition of national
security for the purposes of Decision 144-(52/51), the hesitancy of
states to enter the procedure for approval of sanctions suggests
some doubt as to the legality of their sanctions. To the extent that
this doubt has acted as a brake upon the sanctions, the centralised
approval mechanism of the IMF is contributing to international
peace and security. Unfortunately, no empirical measure of this effect is available.
211. Apr. 9, 1966.
212. Dec. 16, 1966.
213. May 27, 1968.
214. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 3
(1969).
215. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 9.
216. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, 117,
287, 337 (1957). See supra note 204 and accompanying text; cf, Fawcett, The International
Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 32, 65 (1964).
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Finally, if the IMF were to face the problem of defining "national security" (following an objection to a notification under Decision 144-(52/51) for example), the question arises whether the IMF
would decline to pass upon that question. Sir Joseph Gold would
appear to favour complete non-appraisal of political considerations.
The last sentence of Article I setting out the purposes of the IMF
directs the IMF to "be guided in all policies and decisions by the
purposes set forth in this Article." 211 Sir Joseph argues that considerations inconsistent therewith may not be taken into account
by the IMF. 218 Inductively reasoning from the obligations of the IMF
to respect the domestic social and political policies of members in
connection with the regulation of exchange rate policies 219 and par
values, 220 the IMF is said to be impliedly required to take notice
of such policies, but to refrain from passing judgment upon them. 221
However, in devising adjustment program for members with
balance of payments problems, the IMF is permitted to conclude
that economic considerations outweigh national political objectives
if these objectives would prevent a use of IMF resources consistent with the Articles. 222
Of course, that a decision has political consequences does not
make it politically motivated. This element may be seen as inducing Decision No. 144-(52/51). The IMF, in line with the commitment
to centralised rather than unilateral interpretations of international
monetary law, reserves to the Executive Board, with appeal to the
Board of Governors, jurisdiction to interpret the Articles. 223 Restrictions approved by the IMF pursuant to Decision 144-(52/51) cannot
be challenged as inconsistent with the Articles. All of this begs the
question whether the IMF could decline to adjudge one member's

217. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 206, art. I.
218. J. GOLD. supra note 188, at 58; accord Articles of Agreement of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, supra note 195, art. IV(b).
219. Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund art. IV (3)(b), done Apr. 30, 1926, 29 U.S.T. 2204, T.l.A.S. 8932.
220. Id. art. IV(4).
221. J. GOLD. supra note 188, at 60.
222. Decision on Use of Funds, General Resourses, and Stand-By Arrangements, Decision No. 6056-(79/38), Mar. 2, 1979, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 136-38.
223. Second Amendment to the Articles of the International Monetary Fund, supra
note 220, art. XXIX. See generally, J. GOLD. INTERPRETATION BY THE FUND (1968) (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 11).
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claim for national security restrictions in the face of an objection
thereto by another. The toleration of restrictions imposed against
Israel, for example, suggests that the IMF would decline to pass
upon the substantive issues.
F.

A CASE STUDY: THE IRANIAN ASSETS FREEZE IN THE IMF

The handling of the Iranian assets freeze is instructive to show
the importance of the questions. Where currency exchange restrictions are concerned, the IMF does have exclusive jurisdiction over
the problem. The U.S. regulations were adopted on November 14,
1979, and amended five days later. It may be that they were informally notified to the IMF at that time, 224 but they were formally
notified only on November 29, 1979. Iran did try to persuade the
Executive Board to object. 225 These efforts were unsuccessful. 226 The
U.S. regulations were amended on April 7 and 17, 1980. These were
notified on April 28, 1980, and also received automatic approval. 221
It needs to be remembered that the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Executive Board, prepares the agenda for Board
meetings. 228 He must place on it any case which appears to him or
another Executive Director to involve a member not fulfilling its
obligations under the Articles. 229
Iran seems to have lacked the support of even one Executive
Director. The question being one upon which the IMF could request
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article VIII of the Agreement between the IMF and the
UN ,230 it appears that, in the view of the Executive Board, the
legitimacy of the U.S. action was not for judicial consideration.
When first promulgated, the U.S. actions were described as
protective measures in the face of Iranian plans to undermine the
international banking system. As time passed it became clear that
the action was a reprisal for the hostage taking. Nevertheless, the
224. Edwards, Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 870, 875 (1981).
225. Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1979, Al3, col. 1.
226. Letter from George P. Nicoletopoulos, supra note 198.
227. Id.
228. IMF, Rules and Regulations (36th issue, 1979) Rule C-6, in IMF BY·LAWS, Rules
? nd Regulations at 24.
229. Id.; see also Rule K-1 at 44 and Rule S-1 at 62.
230. See Selected Decisions of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents,
supra note 191, at 230-31.
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IMF approval remained in place. Given the selective nature of UN
involvement in world crises, calls for rendering IMF approval conditional upon UN approval or ratification 231 may not be a politically neutral brake on unwarranted restrictions. The IMF would then
be subrogating its power to the political winds in the UN. While
UN approval is a relevant factor, it ought not be a determinative
one.
Restrictions not receiving the imprematur of the IMF cannot
be enforced extraterritorially under Article VIIl(2)(b). By giving
automatic approval after thirty days, the scope for operation of Article VIIl(2)(b) is a wide one. Although the approval has not been
sought by nations in doubt as to the legitimacy of their restrictions
thus far, the policy of automatic approval effectively leaves the issue
of substantive legitimacy for unilateral decision. This issue is the
definition of the threshold state of nature sufficient to ground a
claim for approval. This fits ill with the overall approach to centralised decision-making in the IMF.
On the other hand, rendering restrictions unapproved until
brought before the Executive Board may leave the IMF in the position of declaring a politically expedient restrictio'n economically unjustifiable. The IMF need never make decisions for ostensibly
political reasons. However, by not passing an economic analysis over
sanctions, the economic base of international peace and security
becomes subject to not merely non-regulation but also the compounding nature of enforcement under Article VIIl(2)(b). 232 The
rendering moot of the litigation in London and Paris with respect
to the application of this Article to the Iranian assets freeze has
but stayed the crucial judicial test of Decision 144-(52/51).233

VI. A COMPARISON OF THE GATT AND IMF
APPROACHES TO SECURITY CONCERNS
The bottom line of any comparison of the GATT and IMF approaches to the impact of security concerns upon world trade and
231. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 224 at 897-98.
232. Outside of Article VIIl(2)(b), extra-territorial enforcement would almost certainly
be refused. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract [1978] 2 W.L.R. 84.
233. There are earlier decisions pertinent to this issue. See Baker, Enforcement of Contracts Violating Foreign Exchange Control Laws, 3 INT'L TRADE L.J. 247 (1977); cf, Craigie,
Oakes and L'Estrange, The Presidential Order Freezing Iranian Assets-Some Extraterritorial
Aspects, 8 INT'L TRADE L. SEMINAR PAPERS 329, 341-45 (Austl. 1981).
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monetary law is a test of the effectiveness of each in deterring those
breaches of international economic law whose basis is a security
concern of doubtful objectivity. Within the GATT it is the odium
of the restricting states' trading partners which is the prime deterrent. Trade restrictions imposed under Article XXI operate territorially, excepting of course, the extent to which United States
claims for extraterritorial jurisdiction gain international support.
Only in the Ministerial Declaration of November 1982, was there
an attempt to encourage states to legitimate their invocations of
Article XXL
In its dispute with Nicaragua, the U.S. restrictions would have
been difficult to so legitimate. The United States, therefore, chose
not to oppose the adoption of the GATT Panel's recommendations
to hold its actions in violation of the GATT, and instead relied on
its patent ability to withstand any consequent international
pressures. This attitude implies a disinclination to submit to the
system of multilateral regulation which the United States was so
instrumental in establishing. The United States reaction to the interim decision of the ICJ in the recent dispute with Nicaragua
evidences a similar policy.
By contrast, although the IMF has not had to face the definitional problem of determining which security claims do or do not
validly fall within the ambit of Decision 144-(52/51), it has had
somewhat more success in deterring questionable claims for
legitimacy. Because exchange restrictions generally require international enforcement to be truly effective, and, because pursuant
to Article VIIl(2)(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement approval is
essential to such enforcement where restrictions are imposed for
security reasons, Decision 144-(52/51) assumes focal importance. The
decision throws claims for legitimacy into the limelight for thirty
days. That decision to approve is centralised in the Executive Board.
Its decision is exclusive and subject only to review by the Board
of Governors.
The IMF process of legitimation is less subtle than under the
GATT. As a result, some nations imposing restrictions have been
deterred from seeking approval. Their action remains inconsistent
with the Articles of the IMF unless approved. Action under GA TT
Article XXI bears no similar odium until successfully challenged.
It is difficult to see how the IMF procedure could be effectively
transposed to the GATT context. International enforcement of trade
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restrictions is not an essential ingredient for those restrictions to
have a real impact on the object state. Nicaragua's sugar industry
is the definitive example. On the other hand, if unlegitimated restrictions could validly be mitigated by a centralised compensation
mechanism administered by a politically neutral international institution associated with the GATT, illegitimate restrictions might
be rendered ineffective. This would pressure the restricting state
to submit to multilateral regulation of its actions. In the United
States-Czechoslovakia dispute the cold war trade barriers established by the United States were effectively given a GATT waiver.
The Czech grievance was given an airing. However, by accepting
without reservation the principle that a state's unilateral identification of security crises could not be reviewed, the floodgates were
opened for a limited exception to experience its unregulated growth.
Thus, in the United States-Nicaragua dispute, the United States
was not willing to discuss an economic sanction because it was imposed for security sensitive reasons. Only the allegation of breach
of GATT obligations was investigated and confirmed without an
examination of the validity of the U.S. excuse.
In both of these cases, the dispute may well have been beyond
resolution. There was no discussion of a legal rule which might at
least have helped the parties understand and perhaps reduce the
economic ill effects of their actions. In the absence of a rule promoting consultation, power diplomacy has been given sway and
neither the wealth maximization function of international econo~ic
law, nor the peace promotion function of public international law
was advanced.
The IMF approach provides a thirty day period in which discussion may be pursued. While no substantive rule for limiting the use
of national security as a ground for imposing currency restrictions
has been developed, the system does not admit untrammelled
unilateral interpretation. This alone appears to discourage some
doubtful claims for legitimacy. By not according all claims of national security automatic legitimacy, the subtle processes of international opprobrium are allowed to operate upon the apparently
illegitimate actions. Although these subtle mechanisms do not
always have discernible effects, activating them through rules which
distinguish the excusable from the illegitimate enhances world order
better than a power-based system which does not require even a
limited legitimation of certain international actions.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Having raised the question of whether differently structured
economies can both gain from trade and retain a sense of national
security, this paper has sought to analyse the progress of international economic law in regulating the interface between trade and
defence policies. In the international legal system coercion can
lubricate, but does not fuel the wheels of the legal system. Because
international law often depends upon an imprecise consensus, states
will only behave within the law if they see legally obedient
behaviour to be in their interest. When nations' sense of insecurity leads not only to the distrust of other nations but of the legal
framework in which international relations are conducted, this consensus dissipates. A process of entropic autarky sets in.
This distrust can best be dispelled by giving problems airing
in international forums without necessarily requiring any formal
adjudiciation. International law, after all, is enforced by the subtle
means of peer pressures. Resolution can occur as the states involved
listen to, and perhaps, better understand their neighbours' interests.
They may then be more willing to discuss security concerns knowing that no formal adjudication against their interests will result.
Such an international forum needs to both be and appear to
be an impartial, readily available and effective framework for
facilitating the resolution of disputes. It at least gives the option
of peaceful settlement without further aggravation of the atmosphere of tension and distrust which can lead to non-peaceful
reprisals. Moreover, the availability of such a forum, actively supported by states practice, reduces the perceived normative
legitimacy of less peaceful alternatives. Notwithstanding the finding by the arbitral tribunal in the United States-France dispute,
discussed in Section III.C., that there is no duty to postpone
retaliatory action until less inflammatory yet practicable means for
dispute resolution had been exhausfed, states prefer to be seen as
pursuing non-inflammatory as well as legitimate avenues for
redress.
Following the collapse of the ITO, the GATT emerged as the
primary forum for resolution of international trade disputes. The
rules of and exceptions in the GA TT system may be interpreted
according to competing legal principles. This reflects the different
economic structures of the nations party to and applying the GATT.
An effective consensus has not been achieved. Without effecti'\Te
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multilateral regulation, nations' behaviour under the GATT is likely
to remain non-congruent.
This is precisely what has occured in relation to GATT Article XXL The exception, interpreted literally, is extremely broad
and permits the emasculation of the very objectives of the GATT.
The states' representatives who perform the task of interpretation
are not always seen as impartial in their approaches to this task.
It has been argued that the exception has not been interpreted in
good faith and is proving to be an Achilles heel of the GA TT.
The seeds of entropy were sown in the United StatesCzechoslovakia dispute. Some three decades later in its dispute with
Nicaragua, the United States declined the very jurisdiction of the
GATT by adopting instead an overtly autarkic behaviour. The formal limitation of the exception in the drafting of the GATT to matters of a nation's own national security does not appear to influence
the conduct of the United States. Arguably the non-congruent conduct of the United States has prevented the text of Article XXI
from developing into customary international law. It is even possible
to see the broad practice of claiming exemption under Article XXI
as a declaration by the states concerned that they see GATT obligations as less than legally binding, both in war and cold war climates.
Article XXI is thus unable to fully perform its role of preserving
GATT obligations through periods of cold ear. Moreover, once a
leading nation shows disregard for legal forums, other nations will
follow. The process of entropic autarky snowballs.
The IMF may be contrasted with the parlous state of GATT
practice. In the IMF context, international enforceability of
monetary sanctions taken for security reasons depends upon IMF
approval. The sanctions will be ineffective without such approval.
Former Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal favoured an
American approach which did not involve the IMF making political
judgments, but did involve the IMF continuing to make economic
decisions even where those decisions had political consequencesincluding national security consequences.
Under the Decision 144-(52/51) procedure, the subtle pressures
of international opprobrium are given an opportunity to operate
as states seeking to utilise the national security exception are required to face international scrutiny for at least thirty days. The
IMF acts as regulator rather than as facilitator of settlement as
is the case with the GA TT. The decisionmaker is therefore an im-
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partial institutional authority rather than a number of partial states'
representatives. In the case of the Iranian assets freeze, it was the
IMF action rather than unilateral action which legitimated the protection of the United States dollar from the Iranian threat to undermine that currency. Of course, that a decision has political consequences does not make it politically motivated. Perhaps the essential difference is one of perception. Decisions emanating from the
GATT are not seen as impartial nor as having terribly much legal
relevance. Decisions emanating from the IMF, however, receive a
mark of respect from the international community.
Even if one accepts the argument that the process of entropic
autarky in international economic law is at an advanced stage and,
therefore, the establishment and evolution of a widely applicable
control on claims for the national security exception could not
remedy the situation quickly enough, it is certainly within the power
of world leaders to congregate with a view to developing convergent
policies rather than to continue airing unilateral expressions of
distrust. A liberal world trade order. along with a liberal world
monetary order requires not only a lowering of barriers to international economic transactions, but also active promotion of
economic development for the weak by the strong with a view to
mutual advantage. Not only do the less developed economies gain
by achieving development relevant to their own needs, but the
stronger economies and the world economy as a whole gain by nations entering into their economic and political relations with a sense
of security and willingness to cooperate. It is upon achieving such
a reversal of the present trend towards autarky that international
economic institutions can be developed to maintain a process of
secure, peaceful and prosperous economic development. The process of developing convergence in place of autarky can feasibly be
initiated at the present time. Once the foundations are laid, impartial multilateral regulation of the problems discussed in this article can be developed. The time has arrived where the interface between security and trade issues can no longer be profitably put in
the "too-hard basket."

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5

58

